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TEASINGLY INCONCLUSIVE? – TEASING OUT FROM THE 
TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES THE DRAFTERS’ INTENTIONS ON 
THE SO-CALLED ‘HOMELAND BATTLEFIELD UNPRIVILEGED 
BELLIGERENTS’ UNDER THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS 
 
By Yutaka Arai-Takahashi*  
 
 
INTRODUCTION   
 
This paper will engage in extensive investigations into the legislative 
history of the 1949 Geneva Convention III Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War (hereafter, the “GCIII”) and the 1949 Geneva Convention 
IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (hereafter, 
the “GCIV”). It seeks to explore if the drafters of the Geneva Conventions 
(hereafter, the “GCs”) excluded from the compass of the GCIV 
‘unprivileged belligerents’ (or ‘unlawful combatants’) who are trapped on 
their homeland battlefield (what this author labels as ‘homeland battlefield 
unprivileged belligerents’).1 This issue will necessitate an examination of the 
negotiators’ thoughts on the scope of Part III of the GCIV, which supplies 
the nucleus of the GCIV’s elaborate protections. This paper is purported as a 
sequence to the article that the present writer has published in the previous 
volume of this Yearbook, which has ascertained strengths and weaknesses of 
various interpretive methods proposed to overcome the same issue.2 
 
This paper is based on the present author’s empirical examinations of the 
(published or unpublished) draft records relating to the Diplomatic 
Conference of Geneva (1949) and to a plethora of its predecessor and 
preparatory conferences. These include the original stenographic records that 
are accessible at the Archive of the International Committee of the Red 
Cross and Red Crescent (hereafter, the “ICRC”) and at the Swiss Federal 
Archive. Based on analyses of all those ‘raw materials’ which show the 
drafters’ diverging perceptions of the scope of application of the GCIV, this 
 
*  Professor of International Law and International Human Rights Law, University of Kent, 
Brussels. Special thanks to Prof. Yoram Dinstein and Mr. Jeff Lahav for their helpful 
comments and suggestions on the earlier version of this paper.   
1  For assessment of this issue, see A. Rosas, The Legal Status of Prisoners of War (1976) 
(reprinted in 2005), at 410-413; K. Dörmann, “The Legal Situation of 
‘Unlawful/Unprivileged Combatants’”, 85 Int’l Rev. Red. Cross. 45-73 (2003); and J. 
Callen, “Unlawful Combatants and the Geneva Conventions”, 44 Va. J. Int’l L. 1025 
(2003-4). 
2  Y. Arai-Takahashi, “Unprivileged (Unlawful) Belligerents Captured on a Battlefield and 
the Geneva Conventions”, 48 Isr. Y.B. Hum. Rts. 63 (2018). 
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paper will extrapolate several inferences with regard to ‘homeland battlefield 
unprivileged belligerents’.  
 
The substantive discussions of this paper are divided into four parts. The 
first part will present what may be viewed as the structural inconsistency of 
the GCIV’s scope of application. Faced with this, the second part will defend 
the method of consulting the travaux préparatoires, referring to their special 
relevance and their weight in interpreting treaties. The third part will 
investigate the travaux préparatoires of the GCIV to explore if the drafters 
generally excluded ‘homeland battlefield unprivileged belligerents’, or the 
‘protected persons’ overall, from the elaborate regulatory framework of its 
Part III. The fourth part will analyse the travaux préparatoires of Articles 3 
and 4 of the Stockholm Prisoners of War (POW) Draft (now Articles 4 and 5 
GCIII) with a view to ascertaining if the drafters envisioned the GCIV to 
cover any person left outside the scope of Article 4 of the GCIII. 
 
I. STRUCTURAL DISHARMONY WITHIN THE GCIV 
 
The literal interpretation of the GCIV suggests that the applicability of the 
provisions of Part III of the GCIV is confined only to two situations: (1) the 
territories of the adverse parties to international armed conflict; and (2) the 
occupied territories. This can be borne out by two textual indicators. First, 
under the derogation clause contained in Article 5 GCIV, its first paragraph 
refers to situation (1) while its second paragraph addresses situation (2). 
Second, the spatial context of those two situations fits the regulatory 
structure of Part III of the GCIV. Those two geographical localities 
correspond to the regulatory scope delineated by the first three sections of 
Part III, which are the core of the GCIV. While the title of Section II 
(Articles 35-46) speaks of ‘Aliens in the Territory of a Party to the Conflict’, 
the heading of Section III (Articles 47-78) mentions ‘Occupied Territories’. 
As suggested by its epithet ‘Provisions Common to the Territories of the 
Parties to the Conflict and to Occupied Territories’, Section I of Part III 
(Articles 27-34) covers both those situations.3 In view of these, it seems 
sound to suggest that for the ‘protected persons’ who are found in a combat 
zone of their State (including the ‘homeland battlefield unprivileged 
 
3  Part III of the GCIV contains two more sections: Section IV (Arts. 79-135) addresses 
issues of administrative detention or internment of protected persons, the legal basis of 
which is found in specific provisions contained in Sections II (Arts. 41-43), and Section 
III (Arts. 68 and 78) of Part III. Section V (Arts. 136-141) regulates information bureaux 
and central agency. 
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belligerents’), the applicable provisions of the GCIV are limited only to what 
is left in its Parts I (Articles 1-12, bar Article 5) and II (Articles 13-26).4  
 
However, the presumption that Part III (Sections II-IV) leaves gaps in 
protections is at odds with the concept of ‘protected persons’ defined under 
Article 4 of the GCIV. Left outside the broader concept of ‘protected 
persons’ are essentially only two categories:  (1) those that already fall 
within the purview of the GCI-III; and (2) the nationals of the States that are 
not parties to the GCIV.5 Hence, the textual construction of the GCIV results 
in the ‘structural incoherence’ between the general provision (Article 4), on 
one hand, and the specifically delineated situations contemplated by Article 
5 and (the entirety of) Part III of GCIII, on the other hand.  
 
To overcome the problem of such discrepancy in the personal scope of 
application, this author, in the aforementioned paper in the previous volume 
of this Yearbook,6 has proposed that at least Section I of Part III (Articles 27-
34), whose title does not employ the adjective ‘enemy’ to qualify the phrase 
‘territories of the parties to the conflict’, be construed as covering any 
territory of the belligerent parties, including captives’ own homeland 
battlefield. Still, this teleological solution leaves unaddressed the bulk of 
questions relating to captivity and internment.7  The preferred approach is 
the so-called ‘Dörmann’s theory’ that focuses on the eventual change in the 
legal status of the combat zone in which protected persons come into an 
adversary’s hands or in their possible transfer either to an occupied territory 
 
4  The provisions of Part II are expressly made the exception. Their scope of application is 
even broader than that of Art. 4 of the GCIV to cover all civilians, including nationals of 
the States not parties to the GCIV. The ICRC representative confirmed that while Art. 3 
of the Stockholm Civilians Draft (Art. 4 of the GCIV) contemplated only the civilians of 
enemy nationality, Art. 11 of that Stockholm Draft (Art. 13 of the GCIV) covered ‘the 
entire populations of countries at war’: see Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of 
Geneva of 1949 (hereafter, the “Final Record”), vol. II-A, at 625, Committee III, 3rd 
Meeting (27 Apr. 1949) (Mr. Pilloud, ICRC). See also id., Report of Committee III to the 
Plenary Assembly of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva, 812-846, at 816 (presented at 
51st meeting, Committeee III, 20 July 1949). 
5  Dörmann, supra note 1, at 73. Under Art. 4 of the GCIV, the persons who are disentitled 
to claim the status of ‘protected persons’ are limited to the following categories: (i) 
nationals of a State which is not party to the Convention; (ii) natio ls either of a party to 
the conflict or of an occupying power in which hands they are; (iii) nationals of a co-
belligerent State, which is able to exercise normal diplomatic representation in the 
detaining State; (iv) nationals of a neutral State, captured in the territory of a belligerent 
State, which is able to exercise normal diplomatic representation in the detaining State; 
and (iv) persons who are already covered by the guarantees of GCs I-III.  
6  Arai-Takahashi, supra note 2, at 94-96. 
7  Sec. IV of Part III is excluded because its opening provision, Art. 79, prohibits any 
internment other than in accordance with Arts. 41-43, 68 and 78 of the GCIV. This 
suggests that Art. 27(4) GCIV is insufficient as a legal basis for invoking Sec. IV. 
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or to the adversary’s home territory.8 This theory, grounded as it is also on 
the teleological interpretation pursuant to the humanitarian object and 
purpose, helps operationalise the expansive legal regime of Part III of the 
GCIV. Yet, even this theory is not the panacea for the plight of civilians 
trapped in their homeland battlefield semi-permanently.9 
 
Implications of those two approaches aside, it may be contended that the 
result of interpretation of the GCIV obtained by the methods of 
interpretation according to Article 31 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties (hereafter, the “VCLT”) would be ‘unreasonable’. As 
briefly discussed above, the civilians who fall into the adversary’s hands in 
their homeland battlefield would benefit only from the modicum of the 
GCIV provisions. Those are limited to the combination of the provisions of 
Parts I & II, and those of Section I of Part III if following the above 
interpretive approach that focuses on the wording 'territories of the parties to 
the conflict'. Faced with such apparent lacunae of the GCIV’s protections of 
civilians captured in combat zones of their home country, it can be argued 
that some doubt is cast on the presumption10  that the text of the GCIV 
entertains logical consistency with the context. 11  For this reason, in 
accordance with Article 32 of the VCLT, recourse can be had to the travaux 
préparatoires12 of the Geneva Conventions with a view to clarifying the 
scope of the GCIV contemplated by the negotiators. 
 
Will the draft records confirm or negate the hypothesis that the coverage of 
Part III of the GCIV was purported to be confined only to the ‘protected 
persons’ held in the two spatial settings (the enemy territory and occupied 
territories)? If a response to this question is in the affirmative, this would 
challenge another hypothesis that at the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva 
(1949) there was a generally shared expectation of the GCIV serving as a 
‘gap-filler’ for persons falling outside the valve of the GCIII. 
 
 
8  Dörmann, supra note 1. See also K. Dörmann & L. Colassis, “International Humanitarian 
Law in the Iraq Conflicts”, 47 Ger. Y.B. lnt’l  L., 293 (2004). 
9  See Arai-Takahashi, supra note 2, at 93-94. 
10  U. Linderfalk, “Is Treaty Interpretation an Art or a Science? International Law and 
Rational Decision Making”, 26(1) Eur. J. Int’l L. 169,, 174 (2015). 
11  See P. Merkouris, “Third Party” Considerations and ‘Corrective Interpretation’ in the 
Interpretative Use of Travaux Préparatoires: Is It Fahrenheit 451 for Preparatory Work?”, 
in Treaty Interpretation and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties:  30 Years on, 
75, 87 (M. Fitzmaurice, P. Merkouris & O. Elias eds., 2010). 
12  According to McNair, the travaux préparatoires are defined as “all the documents, such 
as memoranda, minutes of conferences, and drafts of the treaty under negotiation”.  Lord 
A. McNair, The Law of Treaties 411 (1961). 
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II. RELEVANCE AND RELATIVE WEIGHT OF THE TRAVAUX 
PRÉPARATOIRES 
 
A. The Intentionalist v. Textualist Schools of Treaty Interpretation 
 
Before examining how the travaux are understood under Article 32 of the 
VCLT,13 it is essential to discuss briefly two historically opposing strands of 
thought on treaty interpretation (the ‘intentionalist’ and the ‘textualist’), 
which have provided much doctrinal fervour in the runup to this largely 
codificatory treaty. Hersch Lauterpacht famously stressed the importance of 
the intentions of the authors of a treaty,14 contending that “the object of 
interpretation is to arrive at the intention of the parties ex signis maxime 
probabilibus.” 15  In his understanding tinged with critical overtones of 
Begriffsjurisprudenz, the travaux préparatoires occupied “un elément 
fondamental, peut-être le plus important, en matière d’interprétation des 
traités. ”16 In contrast, Fitzmaurice’s textualist interpretation17 stressed the 
significance of ascertaining the intentions of the parties in the text.18 Along 
this line,19 the draft VCLT prepared by the International Law Commission 
 
13  For examinations of the role of the preparatory work in interpreting treaties, see H. 
Lauterpacht, “Some Observations on Preparatory Work in the Interpretation of Treaties”, 
48 Harv. L. Rev. 549 (1935); McNair, supra note 12, ch. XXIII, at 411-23; S. Rosenne, 
“Travaux Préparatoires”, 12 Int’l & Comp. L. Q. 1378 (1963); M. S. McDougal, H.D. 
Laswell and J.C. Miller, The Interpretation of Agreements and World Public Order, at 
122-32 (1967); B.N. Mehrish, “Travaux Préparatoires as an Element in the Interpretation 
of Treaties”, 11 Indian J. Int’l L. 39-88 (1971); M. Ris, “Treaty Interpretation and ICJ 
Recourse to Travaux Préparatoires:  Towards a Proposed Amendment of Articles 31 and 
32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties”, 14 Boston Coll. Int’l & Comp. L. 
Rev. 111 (1991); J. Klabbers, “International Legal Histories: The Declining Importance of 
Travaux Préparatoires in Treaty Interpretation?”, 50(3) Netherlands Int’l L. Rev. 267-288 
(2003). See also G. Fitzmaurice, “The Law and Procedure of the International Court of 
Justice 1951-4:  Treaty Interpretation and Other Treaty Points”, 37 Brit. YB Int’l L. 203 
(1957); H. Lauterpacht, The Development of International Law by the International 
Court, at 116-41 (1982); and I. Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
114-58 (2nd ed., 1984). 
14  H. Lauterpacht, “De L’interpr寐tation des trait寐s”, 43(1) Annuaire de L’Institut de Droit 
Int’l Tome I, 366-434, 457-60, especially at 390-402 (1950). 
15  Lauterpacht, supra note 13 at 571. See also Lauterpacht, “Restrictive Interpretation and 
the Principle of Effectiveness in the Interpretation of Treaties”, 26 Brit. YB Int’l L. 48, at 
52, 55, 73, 75 & 83 (1949). 
16  Lauterpacht, supra note 14, at 397. See also Lauterpacht, ibid., at 83; Lauterpacht, supra 
note 13, at 571. See also Klabbers, supra note 13, at 277; and I. Venzke, How 
Interpretation Makes International Law:  On Semantic Change and Normative Twists, 3 
(2012). 
17  Fitzmaurice, supra note 13, at 204. 
18  Id., at 205, 207.  
19  The ILC’s approach was heavily influenced by the views of the two last rapporteurs 
(Gerald Fitzmaurice and Humphrey Waldock).  
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(the “ILC”) stated that the text of the treaty should be understood as “the 
authentic expression of the intentions of the parties.” 20  For textualists, 
extraneous factors such as the preparatory work are reduced only to a 
secondary role:  they are not supposed to override or change the meaning 
already arrived at by literal construction.21 In tune with the established case-
law of the International Court of Justice (the “ICJ”),22 the ILC appeared to 
restrict the avenues of turning to the preparatory work. It suggested that 
“where the ordinary meaning of the words is clear and makes sense in the 
context, there is no occasion to have recourse to other means of 
interpretation.”23 For the ILC, even when tangible and extrinsic sources such 
as the travaux are relied upon, the object of interpretation boils downs to 
“the elucidation of the meaning of the text rather than an investigation ab 
initio of the supposed intentions of the parties.”24  
  
B. The Purposes of Recourse to the Travaux Préparatoires 
 
Article 32 of the VCLT provides that “[r]ecourse may be had to 
supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the 
treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the 
meaning resulting from the application of Article 31, or to determine the 
meaning when the interpretation according to Article 31 (a) leaves the 
meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b) leads to a result which is manifestly 
absurd or unreasonable.” Literally construed, this provision can be 
understood as recognising the purposes pursuant to which inquiries into the 
preparatory work are permissible in interpreting treaties. This point can be 
corroborated in the commentaries to Article 28 (now Article 32 of the 
VCLT) of the ILC’s Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties (1966).25 The ILC 
stated that apart from the end of confirming the treaty text,26 such historical 
investigations are allowed with a view to determining the meaning when the 
interpretation according to the primary methods laid down in article 27 (now 
 
20  ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with commentaries (1966), Rpts. Int’l L. 
Comm. G.A., (1966-II) YB Int’l L. Comm. 223, para. 18.  
21  Fitzmaurice, supra note 13 at 220. 
22  ICJ, Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United 
Nations, Adv. Op. 28 May 1948, 1948 ICJ 57, at 63. See also ICJ, Ambatielos Case 
(Greece v. UK) (Preliminary Objection), Judgment of 1 July 1952, ICJ Rpt. 1952, at 45; 
ICJ, Territorial Dispute (Libya/Chad), Judgment of 3 February 1994, ICJ Rpt. at 21-22, 
para. 41. 
23  ILC, supra note 20, at 222, para. 18.  
24  Ibid.  
25  Id., para. 19.  
26  Hersch Lauterpacht, in his earlier writing, referred to the role of “throw[ing] abundant 
light upon every expression and nuance of expression, upon what is included and what is 
omitted”, in Lauterpacht, supra note 13, at 575.  See also id., at 588. 
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Article 31 of the VCLT) either “[l]eaves the meaning ambiguous or 
obscure”; or “[l]eads to a result which is manifestly absurd or 
unreasonable.” 27  This comment shows that the role of the travaux in 
determining the treaty text may be divided into two further roles: eliminating 
ambiguity and obscurity; and curing a manifestly absurd or unreasonable 
result.28  
 
The three purposes for which the travaux can be consulted pair with the 
three functions that they perform.29 Apart from the confirmatory function,30 
one can refer to two subcategories of the determinative function:  he 
clarificatory function that seeks to elucidate the meaning of the text that 
remains ambiguous or obscure; and the remedial function that can eschew or 
mend a manifestly absurd or unreasonable outcome arrived at by the method 
of interpretation pursuant to Article 31 VCLT. 31  With regard to the 
confirmatory function, the inquiry into the travaux is supposed to validate 
the interpreters’ working hypothesis in accordance with Article 31 of the 
VCLT. This function can be justified even when the (provisional) meaning 
of the treaty text acquired by the ‘general rule’ under Article 31 appears 
clear.32 This is because epistemically what is exactly ‘an ordinary meaning’ 
(or a ‘natural meaning’) of the terms of a treaty remains always open to 
 
27  ILC, supra note 20, at 223, para. 19. 
28  S. Yee, “Notes on the International Court of Justice (Part 6) – The Fourth Use of Travaux 
Préparatories in the LaGrand Case:  To Prove the Non-preclusion of an Interpretation”. 
16 Chn. J. Int’l L. 351-365, at 353-354 (2017). 
29  On top of those three ‘routes’ to the travaux, Mortenson suggests that as the fourth 
pathway, recourse to them is immediately justifiable in case ‘special meaning’ is intended 
by the parties under Art. 31(4) of the VCLT:  J.D. Mortenson, “The Travaux of Travaux:  
Is the Vienna Convention Hostile to Drafting History?”, 107 Am. J. Int’l L. 780, at 786-
787 (2013). 
30  See ICJ, Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco (France v. 
United States of America), Judgment of 27 Aug. 1952, ICJ Rpt. 1952, at 209, 211. See 
also id. at 229 (dissenting opinion by Judges Hackworth, Badawi, Levi Carneiro and Rau).  
31  ILC, supra note 20, at 222-223, para. 19. 
32  It might seem absurd to invoke the travaux when the text is unambiguous or unobscured:  
K. J. Vandevelde, “Treaty Interpretation from a Negotiator’s Perspective”, 21 Vand. J. 
Transnat. L. 281 at 296 (1988); and R. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, 365 (2nd ed., 
2015). See also the comment by M. S. McDougal of the US Delegation to the Committee 
of the Whole of the Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties in Vienna Conference on 
the Law of Treaties, Meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 31st Meeting, 26 Mar. – 24 
May 1968, A/CONF.39/C.1/SR.31, para. 41, in Official Records of the United Nations 
Conference on the Law of Treaties, First Session (Summary records of the plenary 
meetings and of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole at 167, available at  
http://legal.un.org/diplomaticconferences/1968_lot/docs/english/sess_1/a_conf39_c1_sr3
1.pdf.. 
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variations, depending upon different methods of interpretations. 33  Treaty 
terms are often imbued with contextually-determinable (subjective) values.34 
The meaning may be validated only after the consultation of the preparatory 
work.35 
 
The outer boundaries of the two ‘determinative functions’ of travaux can 
be stretched to include the case where what is determined is not the meaning 
of a specific text but substantive issues relating to the operation of a treaty.36 
Writing in 1957, Fitzmaurice recognised the invocation of the preparatory 
work where “the object is not the interpretation of the text as such, but the 
ascertainment or establishment of a point of substance in relation to the 
Treaty.”37 In the case of Reservations to the Genocide Convention, the ICJ 
had recourse to the preparatory work of the Genocide Convention not for the 
purpose of elucidating any of its particular provisions, but of ascertaining if 
there existed any right of the parties to enter unilateral reservations to it. The 
travaux were scrutinised with a view to assessing the existence of any 
implied or tacit understanding to that effect.38 It is such a pattern of the 
‘legitimate’ recourse to preparatory work that this author proposes to be 
invoked for the purpose of ascertaining the drafters’ intention as to the 
coverage of the GCIV. 
 
C. Post-VCLT Doctrines on the Role of the Travaux Préparatoires 
 
In the post-VCLT doctrinal landscape, the ILC’s apparent textualist 
inclination seems to prevail. Inquiries into the preparatory work are justified 
(only) when the interpretation conforming to Article 31 of the VCLT39 either 
‘leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure’ or ‘leads to a result which is 
manifestly absurd or unreasonable’.40 However, this narrow view overlooks 
 
33  See Lauterpacht, supra note 13, at 571-572. See also id., at 573 (arguing that “the 
statement that an expression is clear is – or ought to be – the result of the process of 
interpretation, not the starting point.”). 
34  See Klabbers, supra note 13 at 287. 
35  See Lauterpacht, supra note 16, at 51. 
36  See Gardiner, supra note 33 at 389 (arguing that the preparatory work can be consulted 
more to support substantive argument than for the purpose of confirmation or 
determination, though such a pattern being closer to the former purpose).  
37  Fitzmaurice, supra note 13, at 218 (emphasis added). 
38  ICJ, Adv. Op., Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide, 28 May 1951, 1951 ICJ Rep 15, at 22-23, 25-26. 
39  Recourse to the preparatory work may at times be to justify teleological construction 
pursuant to the object and purpose of the treaty in question. See Lauterpacht, supra note 
13, at 578. 
40  See also ICJ, Adv. Op., Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United 
Nations (Conditions of Admission), 1948 ICJ 57, at 63 (holding that the text of Art. 4(1) 
of the UN Charter was “sufficiently clear”). 
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that in practice the supplementary means of interpretation laid down in 
Article 32 VCLT are invoked concurrently or in a unity with the principal 
means of interpretation laid down in Article 31 of the VCLT.41 It should also 
be submitted that such a secondary role assigned to the travaux in Articles 
31-32 of the VCLT does not necessarily lend itself to the thesis that the 
VCLT introduces a ‘hierarchy’ in elements of interpretation.42 McDougal, 
stressing the law as a value-laden process in furtherance to certain 
overarching community policies, dismissed any perceived hierarchy between 
the primary and subsidiary means of interpretation.43 He ascribed equally 
important weight to the preparatory work insofar as this is essential for 
identifying overarching community policies. 44  Indeed, Mortenson’s study 
unveils that the ILC envisaged Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT to manifest 
not a hierarchical order but a single process of logical presentations. 45 
Following his finding, this paper assumes that the interpretative apparatus of 
Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT should be understood as presenting not so 
much the ‘threshold conditions’46 for invoking the travaux47 as the purposes 
for which they can be consulted. 
 
D. Discordance between the Travaux Préparatoires and the Treaty 
Text 
One question that arises when investigating the travaux of the Geneva 
Conventions is what to do in case of their disharmony with the meaning of 
the text (or first impression thereof).48 It may turn out that the ‘ordinary 
 
41  Mortenson, supra note 29, at 786. 
42  Still, this point has been implicitly recognized in the case-law: ICJ, Legality of Use of 
Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Belgium) (Preliminary Objections), Judgment of 15 Dec. 
2004, para. 100. For support of such view, see R. Gardiner, “The Role of Preparatory 
Work in Treaty Interpretation”, in 40 Years of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, ch. 5, at 97-115 (A. Orakhelashvili & S. Williams eds., 2010). 
43  M. McDougal, “The International Law Commission’s Draft Articles Upon Interpretation:  
Textuality Redivivus”, 61 Am. J. Int’l L. 992, 995, 997-998. 
44  Ris, supra note 13, at 115-116. 
45  Mortenson, supra note 29, at 800, 802 & 816-817. 
46  Id., at 787. 
47  Id., at 798, 800 (suggesting that the ILC’s 1964 draft was purported to eliminate the 
‘threshold requirements’ for inquiries into the travaux, and that the enumeration of those 
specific avenues was meant not to limit the occasion for consulting the drafting history, 
but to articulate the purposes for which they can be used).   
48  See the statement of the Portuguese representative, Mr. Crucho de Almeida, Vienna 
Conference on the Law of Treaties, Meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 33rd 
Meeting, 26 Mar. – 24 May 1968, A/CONF.39/C.1/SR.33, para. 56, in Official Records of 
the United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, First Session (Summary records of 
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meaning’ obtained by the general rule under Article 31 of the VCLT does 
not represent the intention of the parties. 49  The preparatory work may 
disclose hidden ambiguity lurking behind the treaty provisions that have 
hitherto struck interpreters (deceptively) as clear.50 Trickily, it may well be 
that the historical tracing uncovers an ‘inconvenient truth’:  a narrower 
meaning and a more constricted ambit of treaty provisions intended by the 
negotiators. With respect to treaties such as the Geneva Conventions that are 
built on humanitarian premises, there is every reason to suggest that the 
meaning and scope of protections pursuant to the textual construction ought 
not to be eclipsed by the restrictive interpretation even when backed up by 
the travaux.51 In contrast, it is possible that the travaux may reveal elements 
that, departing from the literal interpretation, reinforce the teleological 
interpretation fostering more effective protections of individual persons.52 
 
Disaccord between the interpreters’ preliminary perception of the meaning 
of the treaty text and the travaux has been the subject of enriched doctrinal 
debates over decades. In such situations, as noted by Hersch Lauterpacht as 
early as 1935,53 there are two options:  either to ignore the preparatory work 
and adhere to the textual meaning, or to override the literal indicator by the 
discoveries gleaned from the preparatory work. 54  Textualist authors may 
prefer the first option, contending that the (clear) meaning reached by the 
interpretation promoted by Article 31 of the VCLT should be prioritized.55 In 
contrast, Judge Schwebel has suggested that, given the primary duty to 
interpret a treaty in good faith, as set out in Article 31(1) of the VCLT, an 
 
49  Y. Le Bouthillier, “Article 32”, in The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties – A 
Commentary, 841 at 847, para. 12 (O. Korten & P. Klein eds., 2011). 
50  See the statement by Yasseen (Iran) in the ILC (‘…the clearness or ambiguity of a 
provision was a relative matter; sometimes one had to refer [to] the preparatory work…in 
order to determine whether the text was really clear and whether the seeming clarity was 
not simply a deceptive appearance’): ILC, 1964-I YB Int’l L. Comm., at 313, para. 56. See 
also Gardiner, supra note 33 at 355. 
51  Lauterpacht, supra note 16, at 61 (arguing that the absence of the relevant common 
intentions of the parties should not lead to the method of interpretation affiliated to the 
Lotus doctrine such as the restrictive interpretation); Gardiner, supra note 33, at 406. 
Compare A. Orakhelashvili, ‘Restrictive Interpretation of Human Rights Treaties in the 
Recent Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights’, (2003) 13 European 
Journal of International Law 529. 
52  Compare Fitzmaurice (1957), supra note 13 at 206 (noting that even a textualist terrain is 
not barren in the idea of using the travaux, for instance, to rationalise a teleological 
construction). 
53  Lauterpacht (1935), supra note 13, at 583. 
54  There is also a possible third view suggesting that it is not possible to decide a general 
and ‘abstract’ rule on this matter:  Mehrish, supra note 13, at 87.  
55  E. Canal-Forgues, ‘Remarques sur le recours aux travaux preparatoires dans le 
contentieux internatinal’, (1993) Revue générale de droit international public 901-937 at 
913. 
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authoritative interpreter such as an international tribunal should even be 
required to ‘correct’ the ordinary meaning by invoking the travaux.56 
 
Where the negotiating history disconfirms the prima facie plain meaning 
gained by the method of interpretation under Article 31 of the VCLT, the 
courts are at liberty to decide whether or not to overrule this by reference to 
that negotiating history, arguing that on the second thought such meaning 
proves to be indefinite. 57  They can claim to have overlooked ‘latent 
ambiguity in the text’.58 As the second possibility, they may contend, albeit 
less persuasively, that after reflection, the initial tentative interpretation is 
found to reveal the concealed outcome that is “manifestly absurd or 
unreasonable”.59  
 
E. Evaluating the Recourse to the Travaux Préparatoires 
 
While the method of invoking the travaux préparatoires to infer the 
drafters’ original intention is crucial, a few cautious remarks ought to be 
borne in mind. First of all, it can be seriously asked why the intention of the 
negotiators should carry greater weight than that of the ratifying States.60 
Doubtless, consulting the preparatory work is limited inevitably to 
deciphering the positions only of the original parties to the treaty, 61 
excluding those of acceding (or newly independent) States.62 In response to 
such a legitimate question, this author suggests that as long as the travaux 
are published and accessible,63 there should be no reason to refrain from the 
 
56  S. Schwebel, ‘May Preparatory Work be Used to Correct Rather than Confirm the ‘Clear’ 
Meaning of a Treaty Provision?’, in:  J. Makarczyk (ed.), Theory of International Law at 
the Threshold of the 21st Century, (Leiden:  Brill, 1996), pp. 541-7. According to Aust, 
this approach is consistent with the practice: A. Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice, 
(Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2000), at 197. See also Merkouris, supra note 
11, at 93-94 (suggestiong that the so-called ‘corrective’ role of the travaux be understood 
as part of the ‘determinative’ function of Art. 32 of the VCLT). 
57  Vandevelde, supra note 32, at 296-297. 
58  Mortenson, supra note 29, at 787. 
59  Ibid. With respect to a specific term, there is a third possibility that the travaux may 
disclose the parties’ intention to give ‘special meaning’ to it:  ibid. 
60  Merkouris, supra note 11, at 75-76 (referring to ‘an ossifying effect’ of referring to the 
travaux). 
61  Mortenson, supra note 29, at 785. 
62  Klabbers, supra note 13 at 280. 
63  In the doctrines, ‘accessibility’ of the preparator work is considered a key criterion for 
recourse to them:  M.E. Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties, (Leiden:  Brill, 2009), at 446.  
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historical interpretation.64 In such circumstances, it can be argued that when 
acceding to it, States are cognizant of the regulatory scheme envisioned by 
the original framers of the treaty. 
 
Second, while interpretation is purported to throw light on how the text 
gives expression to the common intention of the framers,65 its very existence 
may be contestable.66 The positions of representatives on issues of substance 
in the drafting process can be bewilderingly divergent.67 It may transpire that 
drafters express (different, rivalling and even contradicting) thoughts and 
proposals.68 Distilling common understandings (if any) of the negotiators 
from raw data comprised of their unconsummated exchanges of proposals is 
a veritable challenge, and hardly an orderly or harmonious exercise.69 Hence, 
one is always confronted with an epistemic question of how to discern the 
(common) intentions of the parties.70 The VCLT provides little guidance on 
how the ‘recourse’ to the preparatory work should be made, other than by 
general reference to the purpose of such recourse as being either to confirm 
or determine meaning.71 A way out of such an epistemically vexed situation 
is to suggest a nuanced and abstract assessment of the ‘common intention of 
the treaty taken in its entirety’72 and to reconstruct a presumed common 
intention of the parties based on shared expectation of the negotiators. For 
that purpose, it is essential to pay heed to both historical circumstances of a 
 
64  Merkouris, supra note 11, at 81-82 and 87. See also H. Lauterpacht, ‘Les Travaux 
Preparatories et L’interpretation des Traites’, (1934) 48-II Recueil des Cours 709-817, at 
808. 
65  See the remarks by the Special Rapporteur, Sir Humphrey Waldock, in (1964-II) 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, at 58, para. 21 (stressing the primary aim 
of finding out the general understanding of the parties). 
66  See Lauterpacht (1949), supra note 16, at 52 (‘the treaty- far from giving expression to 
any common intention of the parties -actually registers the absence of any common 
intention (either in general or in relation to the subject-matter of the dispute)’). 
67  It is uncertain if the travaux préparatoires can ‘clearly’ point to a definite legislative 
intention:  R. Gardiner (2010), supra note 42, at 99. 
68  Le Bouthillier, supra note 48, at 847, para. 12. In some cases, the preparatory work may 
reveal that the negotiators did not clarify what their common understanding, if any, was: 
Gardiner (2010), supra note 42, at 105.  
69  Gardiner (2010), ibid.  
70  Indeed, as most treaties are not adopted by consensus, a quest for any common intention 
of the parties might be criticised as a futile, if not fallacious, endeavour or even a fiction. 
See L. Ehrlich, ‘L’Interprétation des traités’, (1928) 24 Recueil des Cours 1-145, at 66; C. 
Djeffal, Static and Evolutive Treaty Interpretation- A Functional Reconstruction, 
(Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2016), at 104. See also Fitzmaurice (1957), 
supra note 13 at 205 and 217. 
71  See McNair, supra note 12, at 411 (“It is not possible to state any rules of law governing 
the question whether and, if so, to what extent international courts and tribunals…are 
entitled to look at “preparatory work….”); Gardiner, supra note 33, at 382.  
72  Lauterpacht (1949), supra note 16, at 76. 
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treaty’s creation and to “its object ascertained by the general tendency of its 
clauses”.73 The cogency of such historical inquiries stands insofar as they are 
done in a principled and consistent manner.74  
 
III. TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES OF THE GCIV 
 
A. Overview  
 
The preceding doctrinal examinations have upheld that notwithstanding the 
perceived secondary place assigned to the travaux in the VCLT, the 
importance of their confirmatory and determinative functions stands. This 
paper has already identified lingering uncertainty surrounding the apparent 
incongruence of the GCIV between the scope of application of Article 4 and 
that of Part III (and of Article 5). Confronted with this situtation, historical 
investigations and inductive analyses will focus on the negotiators’ 
intentions in relation to the personal ambit of application contemplated by 
Article 4 of the GCIV and its precursors formulated in the context of the 
conferences prior to the Diplomatic Conference (1949). 
 
B. The Tokyo Draft Text 
 
The genesis of the Civilians Convention dates back as early as the ICRC’s 
Draft International Convention on the Condition and Protection of Civilians 
of Enemy Nationality Who are on Territory Belonging to or Occupied by a 
Belligerent, which was adopted at the XVth International Red Cross 
Conference at Tokyo in 1934 (the “Tokyo Draft”).75 Article 1 of the Tokyo 
Draft defines the meaning of ‘enemy civilians’ as follows: 
 
‘Les civils ennemis, dans le sens de la présente 
Convention, sont les personnes qui réunissent les deux 
conditions suivantes: 
 
a) ne pas appartenir aux forces armées terrestres, 
maritimes et aériennes des belligérants, telles 
qu’elles sont définies par le droit international, 
notamment par les art. 1, 2 et 3 du Règlement annexé 
à la Convention de la Haye, N°IV, concernant les 
 
73  Ibid.  
74  Compare Gardiner, supra note 33, at 353. 
75  Projet de convention concernant la condition et la protection des civils de nationalité 
ennemie qui se trouvent sur le territoire d’une belligérant ou sur un territoire occupé par 
lui:  Rapports Présentés à la Xve Conférence Octobre 1934, vol. I, Document No. 9, 
XVeme Conférence internationale de la Croix-Rouge, Tokio, 20 octobre 1934, at 3-4. 
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lois et coutumes de la guerre sur terre, du 18 octobre 
1907 ; 
 
b) être ressortissant d’un pays ennemi et se trouver sur 
le territoire d’un belligérant ou sur un territoire 
occupé par lui ». 
 
The Tokyo Draft envisaged two spatial contexts (a belligerent’s territory 
and occupied territory). At the Tokyo Conference, there was even a 
suggestion that two separate Conventions should be drafted:  one dealing 
with civilians in the territory of a belligerent State; and the other relating to 
civilians in occupied territory.76 While the latter circumstance was already 
dealt with in the 1907 Hague Regulations, with the civilian population 
benefiting from its Section III (Articles 42-56), the former scenario was 
considered new.77 It might be suggested that the laconic style of the Tokyo 
Draft entailed a probably unintended advantage. One might contend that the 
Draft did not necessarily demand that the captor State be the one in whose 
territory civilians were held, so that this text did not necessarily rule out the 
civilians trapped in combat zones of their home (or co-belligerent) State. 
Yet, this is a rather strained interpretation of condition b) of the text that 
expressly mentioned ‘a national of an enemy State and finds oneself in the 
territory of a belligerent….’78 
 
C. The Draft Civilians Text Proposed by the Conference of 
Government Experts (CGE) 
 
In the aftermath of the Second World War, the ICRC submitted its 
proposals and first drafts to the Preliminary Conference of National Red 
Cross Societies at Geneva (1946) (July 26 to August 3, 1946). 79  At the 
subsequent Conference of Government Experts (the “CGE”) at Geneva 
(April 14 to 26, 1947),80 Article 2 of the CGE’s Civilians Draft, which was 
 
76  Ibid. 
77  Ibid. 
78  Emphasis added.  
79  Following a number of suggestions made by National Societies, the ICRC produced 
comprehensive reports for the Stockholm Conference: ICRC, XVth International Red 
Cross Conference (Stockholm, August 1948), Draft Revised or New Conventions for the 
Protection of War Victims Established by the International Committee of the Red Cross 
with the Assistance of Government Experts, National Red Cross Societies and Other 
Humanitarian Associations, No. 4a, at 2 (1948) (hereinafter: “ICRC 1948a”). 
80  The Conference was comprised of seventy representatives of only fifteen Governments. 
Ibid. 
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crafted by the Third Commission,81 defined its personal scope of application 
as follows: 
 
The civilians to whom the stipulations of the present 
Conventions apply, are the persons who fulfill the 
following cumulative conditions: 
 
(a) That of not belonging to the armed forces, as defined 
in the Convention relative to the treatment of 
Prisoners of War; 
(b) That of being nationals of an enemy country; 
(c) That of being either in the territory of a belligerent, 
on board a vessel of the latter’s nationality, or in 
territory occupied by him, or of having fallen by any 
other means into his hands.82 
 
Condition (c) of Article 2 of the CGE draft demarcated the spatial context 
contemplated by its drafters. It recapitulated the two situations delineated by 
the ICRC’s Tokyo Civilians Draft (enemy territory and occupied territory). 
Again, as with the Tokyo Draft, it might be submitted that the textual 
structure of the CGE text did not necessarily demand such enemy nationals 
to be caught in the territory of their adversary.83 
 
Another hallmark of condition (c) of Article 2 of the CGE’s Civilians Draft 
was the expression “or of having fallen by any other means into his hands”.84 
This expression could be understood as covering any conceivable way in 
which civilians could come into adversary’s hands.85 Hence, its potential role 
as a safety-net would have been of special relevance to persons of temporary 
status such as asylum-seekers, travelers, and international humanitarian 
 
81  See ICRC, Report on the Work of the Conference of Government Experts for the Study of 
the Conventions for the Protection of War Victims (Geneva, April 14-26, 1947), Series I, 
No. 5b (1947)  (hereinafter “Report of the CGE”). For instance, the Report of the Third 
Commission referred to the expression ‘civilian enemy aliens’.  Id., at 269 and 272. 
82  Ibid., at 273. 
83  The first limb of condition (c), i.e., “[t]hat of being either in the territory of a belligerent’ 
did not append the word ‘enemy’ or ‘adverse’. This is similar to the title of Sec. I of Part 
III under the GCIV. 
84  Report of the CGE, supra note 80, at 273 (emphasis added). 
85  According to the Report of the CGE, this expression was “added to cover all future 
contingencies”. Ibid. (emphasis added). This expression was purported to go even beyond 
Art. 12 of the Tokyo Draft. The latter provided that “[e]nemy civilians who for any reason 
may be brought into the territory of a belligerent during hostilities shall benefit by the 
same guarantees as those who were in the territory at the outset of military operations”.  
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(relief) or health care workers dispatched to address urgent need in the 
belligerent’s territory.  
 
In parallel to the CGE text, the ICRC proposed the following text with two 
cumulative conditions: 
 
(a) That [the condition] of not belonging to the armed 
forces, as defined in the PW [Prisoners of War] 
Convention; 
(b) That of being nationals of an enemy country and of 
residing in the territory of a belligerent, or in a territory 
occupied by him.86 
 
As compared with the CGE text, the ICRC’s parallel text was more 
restrictive. Its condition (b), requiring enemy nationals to be resident in a 
belligerent’s territory, seemed to reinforce the preclusion of civilians 
captured in the invaded zone of their own belligerent State. It did not matter 
whether they had taken up arms or otherwise participated in hostilities when 
captured. The narrower ambit of the ICRC text was discernible also in 
excluding persons who entered a belligerent territory on temporary ground 
(such as travelers, asylum-seekers, and workers for humanitarian or relief 
societies sent for emergency).  
 
D. From the ICRC’s Post-CGE Civilians Draft Text to the Stockholm 
Civilians Draft  
 
Following intense consultations in the wake of the CGE (1947), the ICRC 
submitted its revised text of the draft Civilians Convention 87  to the 
Stockholm Conference in 1948.88 The first sentence of Article 3(1) of the 
ICRC’s post-CGE Civilians Draft provided that “[t]he persons protected by 
the present Convention are those who, at a given moment and in whatever 
manner, find themselves, in the case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands 
of a Power of which they are not nationals”.89 Two hallmarks of this post-
 
86  Ibid. (emphasis added). 
87  ICRC 1948a, supra note 78, at 2. 
88  The Conference (20-30 Aug. 1948) was attended by fifty Governments and fifty-two 
National Red Cross Societies. ICRC, Revised and New Draft Conventions for the 
Protection of War Victims – Texts Approved and Amended by the XVIIth International Red 
Cross Conference (Revised Translation), at 5 (1948) (hereinafter, “ICRC 1948b”). 
89  The entirety of Art. 3 provides as follows: 
The persons protected by the present Convention are those who, at a given moment and in 
whatever manner, find themselves, in the case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Power 
of which they are not nationals. Furthermore, in case of a conflict not international in character, 
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CGE text ought to be underscored. First, the concept of ‘civilians’, which 
had been used in the CGE text, was replaced by that of ‘protected persons’. 
Second, as is of special significance to the central theme of this paper, 
Article 3 of the post-CGE Civilians text eliminated any reference to ‘the 
territory of a belligerent’. Curiously, exactly what lay behind such a decision 
entailing potentially crucial implications remains unexplained in the draft 
records.  
 
The XVIIth International Red Cross Conference at Stockholm (August 
1948) approved and amended the new Draft Civilians Convention 90 
alongside three other post-CGE draft texts of the GCI-III. Article 3 of this 
Stockholm Civilians Draft set its personal parameters, with only cosmetic 
changes in the above post-CGE ICRC text. This provision read: 
 
Persons protected under the present Convention are those 
who, at a given moment and in whatever manner, find 
themselves, in the case of a conflict or occupation, in the 
hands of a Power of which they are not nationals; 
furthermore, in case of a conflict not international in 
character, the nationals of the country where the conflict 
takes place and who are not covered by other 
international conventions, are likewise protected by the 
present Convention. [Emphasis added].  
 
The provisions of Part II are, however, wider in application, as defined in 
Article 11. 
 
Persons such as prisoners of war, the sick and wounded, the members of 
medical personnel, who are the subject of other international conventions, 
remain protected by the said conventions.91 
 
                      
the nationals of the country where the conflict takes place and who do not participate in hostilities, 
are equally protected by the present Convention. 
The provisions of Part II are, however, wider in application, as defined in Article 11. 
Persons such as prisoners of war, the sick and wounded, the members of medical personnel, who 
are the subject of other international Conventions, remain protected by the said Conventions. 
 
XVIIth International Red Cross Conference (Stockholm, Aug. 1948), ICRC 1948a, supra note 
78, at 154. 
90  ICRC 1948b), supra note 87. 
91  Final Record, vol. I, at 114-115 (emphasis in original), indicating the amendment adopted 
at the Stockholm Conference (1948). 
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It was this Stockholm Civilians Draft 92  that provided the basis for 
deliberations for Committee III of the subsequent Diplomatic Conference at 
Geneva (1949). 
 
E. The Scope of Application of the Draft Civilians Convention 




Before embarking upon detailed analyses, it can be commented that 
Committee III, which approved the text of Article 3 of the Stockholm 
Civilians Draft,93 did not engage in elaborate discussions on the personal 
scope of this provision or of the Civilians Convention as a whole. The 
relative paucity of Committee III’s debates relating specifically to 
unprivileged belligerents marks a contrast to Committee II’s elaborate 
discussions on this subject under the Stockholm POW Draft, as will be 
explored below. 
 
For the purpose of examining the scope of the application of the GCIV, it 
is essential to ascertain Committee III’s discourse on three aspects of the 
Civilians Draft.94 First, inquiries will be made into the debates on the general 
rule contained in Article 3 (now Article 4 GCIV), focusing on how the 
drafters understood the concept of the ‘protected persons’ in relation to 
unprivileged belligerents. Second, examinations will turn to the draft records 
of Article 3A (now Article 5 of the GCIV) for the purpose of ascertaining 
how its scope of application was conceived. This general derogation clause, 
which had not appeared in the Stockholm Draft, was first introduced at the 
Diplomatic Conference. As explained above, this clause lacked a specific 
paragraph dealing with active combat zones. Third, examinations will focus 
on the draft records of Section I of Part III of the GCIV with a view to 
discovering if the negotiators of the GCIV intended the provisions of Section 
I of Part III to encompass ‘protected persons’ captured on battlefield. Such 
examinations will be of crucial significance for testing the strength of the 
teleological interpretation discussed above. 
 
 
92  Art. 3 of this Stockholm Draft differed from the post-CGE ICRC text in two respects: (i) 
the omission of reference to the clause “who do not participate in hostilities” in the 
context of non-international armed conflict; and (ii) the introduction of the exclusionary 
clause “and who are not covered by other international conventions”. 
93  It was adopted by 28 votes to nil, with 11 abstentions: Final Record, vol. II-A, at 796, 
Committee III, 48th Meeting, 18 Jul. 1949. 
94  The outcome was with 38 votes to none with 8 abstentions:  id., at 801-802, Committee 
III, 50th Meeting, (19 Jul. 1949). See also Report of Committee III to the Plenary 
Assembly of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva, ibid., at 812. 
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2. Debates on Article 3 of the Stockholm Civilians Draft 
 
In Committee III, some delegates took issue with the wide scope of Article 
3 of the Stockholm Civilians Draft. The United Kingdom delegate objected 
that “[i]f Article 3 remained unchanged…[this] would also cover individuals 
participating in hostilities in violation of the laws of war”.95 His rationale 
was that “[t]he whole conception of the Civilians Convention was the 
protection of civilian victims of war and not the protection of illegitimate 
bearers of arms, who could not expect full protection under rules of war to 
which they did not conform”.96 Extending protections to ‘illegitimate bearers 
of arms’ such as ‘criminals and saboteurs’ was considered to jeopardise “the 
interests of the regular soldier and of the general conduct of war, as all 
persons engaged in hostilities should conform to the rules of war”.97 By 
ensuring that such “persons who were not entitled to protection under the 
Prisoners of War Convention would receive exactly the same protection by 
virtue of the Civilians Convention”, regardless of their adherence to laws of 
war, Article 3 of Draft Civilians Convention was deemed hardly to 
incentivize compliance with such laws.98 Still, it might be contended that the 
United Kingdom delegation’s main concern was to preclude unprivileged 
belligerents wherever they were found. This might not have necessarily 
excluded unarmed civilians stranded in their homeland combat zones.  
 
At the Plenary, the USSR delegate’s cardinal assumption as to the compass 
of the proposed GCIV was revealed when he proposed to delete the first 
sentence of Article 3(2) of the Stockholm Civilians Draft (which denied the 
applicability of the Convention to nationals of States not signatory to it).99 
He asserted that the elementary rules of humane treatment “should apply, in 
the same degree, to any category of protected persons, regardless of their 
civilian status”.100 What can be gathered from his comment no less obliquely 
 
95  See id., at 621, Committee III, 2nd Meeting, 26 Apr. 1949 (Brigadier General Page, UK). 
See also id (Colonel Du Pasquier, Switzerland & Mr. Castberg, Norway). 
96  Ibid. See also the view of Colonel Du Pasquier (Switzerland) and Mr. Castberg (Norway) 
that highlighted the minimum humane treatment for unlawful combatants. Ibid. 
97  Id., at 620-621, Committee III, 2nd meeting, 26 Apr. 1949 (Brigadier General Page, UK). 
For the consistent British stance as to the question of independent militia since the 
1899/1907 Hague Peace Conferences, see K. Nabulsi, Traditions of War – Occupation, 
Resistance, and the Law, 6-11 (1999). 
98  Final Record, vol. II-A, at 620-621, Committee III, 2nd meeting, 26 Apr. 1949. Further, 
the UK delegate suggested that civilians in occupied territory owed the “duty to behave in 
a peaceful manner and not to take part in hostilities”. Ibid. 
99  The first sentence of the second paragraph had been introduced by the majority of the 
Drafting Committee of Committee III on the proposal of Professor Castberg (Norway);  
Final Record, Vol. II-B, at 376, 23rd Plenary Meeting, 1 Aug. 1949 (Mr. Wershof, 
Canada). 
100  Ibid. (emphasis added). 
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was his presumption that the Civilians Convention should serve as the ‘gap-
filler’ for any person that would fall outside the purview of the GCIII. 
Accordingly, it can be surmised that the Soviet delegate grasped even 
unprivileged belligerents captured on a battlefield to be ‘saved’ by the Draft 
Civilians Convention. Nevertheless, it turned out that when the entire text of 
Article 3 was voted,101 the USSR amendment, which could have served as a 
lead-in to potentially wider discussions on the coverage of the GCIV, was 
rejected decisively.102  
 
3. Debates on Article 3A of the Draft Civilians Convention (Article 5 
of the GCIV) 
 
Back in Committee III, the Australian delegation proposed a derogation 
clause into the draft Civilians Convention.103 Their rationale was that the 
rights of the State to deal with irregulars, such as spies, saboteurs, fifth 
columnists and traitors, were insufficiently defined. 104  In response, the 
Drafting Committee introduced a new provision, Article 3A (the precursor to 
Article 5).105 The first paragraph of this provision read that “[w]here in the 
territory of a belligerent, the Power concerned is satisfied that an individual 
protected person is definitely suspected of or engaged in activities hostile to 
the security of the State, such individual person shall not be entitled to claim 
such rights and privileges under this Convention as would, if exercised in the 
favour of such individual person, be prejudicial to the security of such 
State”.106 
 
On closer inspection, there was a difference between the first paragraph of 
Article 3A of the Draft Civilians Convention and the corresponding 
paragraph of the GCIV (the first paragraph of Article 5). This concerns none 
other than the question of applicability of the derogation clause to 
unprivileged belligerents captured in a combat zone of their home or co-
belligerent territory. The text of Article 3A(1) was drawn up with the 
proclamation that “[w]here in the territory of a belligerent, the Power 
 
101  Ibid (by 31 votes with no opposition and with 9 abstentions). 
102  Id., at 376-377 (by 28 votes to 9, with 5 abstentions). Note the criticism of Mr. Wershof 
(Canada) that giving protections of the Civilians Convention to nationals of the enemy 
State not signatory to it even would be a ‘danger’, see ibid. 
103  This new draft Art. 3A was adopted by 5 votes (Canada, US, France, UK and 
Switzerland) at the Drafting Committee. While the Norwegian delegation abstained from 
voting, the USSR delegate urged its deletion; id., at 796, 49th Meeting of Committee III.  
See also Final Record, vol. III (Annexes), at 100-101, para. 195. 
104  Final Record, vol. II-A, at 622, Committee III, 2nd Meeting, 26 Apr. 1949 (Colonel 
Hodgson, Australia).  
105  Ibid. 
106  Final Record, vol. III (Annexes), at 100-101, para. 195. 
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concerned is satisfied….”107 Hence, it left the possibility that the territorial 
belligerent State might not have to be identical to the ‘Power concerned’ 
who would capture suspicious civilians. 108  This should be compared to 
Article 5(1) of the GCIV, which decrees that “[w]here, in the territory of a 
Party to the conflict, the latter is satisfied….” The addressee of Article 3A 
was precise. It demanded that the territorial State in which protected persons 
are found should be the one that takes certain controlling measures over the 
impugned protected persons.109 
 
Subsequently, the wording of Article 3A(1) of the Working Draft was 
slightly changed by Drafting Committee, which moulded the latter into the 
current textual formula of Article 5(1) GCIV. There was no discussion on 
any potential ramification of this change (much less on the seldom 
noticeable consequence that the text would no longer be capable of 
encompassing the case of unprivileged belligerents captured by the invading 
adversary in their homeland battlefield). It seemed that the delegates were 
distracted by a more pressing question:  whether it was proper to introduce 
Article 3A as the general clause of derogation, rather than to append a 
specific escape clause to a particular provision.110 Following the amendment 
entered by Drafting Committee, Committee II adopted the text of Article 
3A.111 
 
At the Plenary, of special relevance to assessing the ambit of the GCIV was 
the USSR’s criticism that the text of Article 3A entailed the risk of the 
collective application of sweeping measures. 112  The USSR Delegation 
proposed that this derogation clause113 should be replaced by a provision of 
more moderate nature;  a clause that would constrain the material scope of 
 
107  Ibid., emphasis added. 
108  As seen above, this is akin to Art. 1 of the 1934 Tokyo Draft and Art. 2 of the 1947 CGE 
Civilians Draft. 
109  See also the unsuccessful proposal submitted by six states (Austria, Burma, France, 
Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey) to the Plenary Assembly for reconsideration of Art. 3A, 
which retained such original wording concerning the addressee; see Final Record, vol. III 
(Annex), at 101, para. 196. 
110 See ibid., at 796-797, 813-815 (criticisms raised by three former communist States, USSR, 
Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, and Report of Committee III to the Plenary Assembly of the 
Diplomatic Conference of Geneva). 
111  Final Record, Vol. II-A, at 798, Committee III, 49th Meeting, 18 Jul. 1949, 3pm (by 29 
votes to 8, with 7 abstentions). For the definition of activities “hostile to the security of 
the State”, see The Commentary on the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, at 56 (J. Pictet ed., 1958) (hereinafter: 
“Pictet’s Commentary to GCIV”), at 56 (defining them as “probably above all espionage, 
sabotage and intelligence with the enemy Government or enemy nationals”). 
112  Final Record, vol. II-B, at 377-378.  
113  Ibid., at 379, 23rd Plenary Meeting, 1 Aug. 1949 (Mr. Morosov, USSR). 
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derogation only to the rights of communications, and its personal ambit only 
to the persons convicted of espionage and sabotage.114 The USSR’s working 
assumption seemed to be that while proposing such an amendment to Article 
3A, spies and saboteurs fell within the general coverage of the GCIV. 
However, this cogent proposal was outweighed by the objection that to limit 
the effect of derogation only to those convicted of espionage or sabotage 
would be too restrictive for the occupying power to deal effectively with its 
legitimate security concern. 115  In the end, the USSR’s amendment, as 
modified by Bulgaria’s sub-amendment,116 was defeated117 whilst the text of 
Article 3A was endorsed by the Plenary Assembly.118  
 
4. The Drafters’ Thought on the Scope of Application of Section I of 
Part III of the GCIV 
 
To recall, the literal interpretation arrives at a hypothesis that under the 
GCIV the drafters considered civilians trapped in their homeland battlefield 
to be barred from the ambit of Section I of Part III. The investigations into 
the travaux confirms such a hypothesis. At the Diplomatic Conference of 
Geneva, Committee III never bothered to query if there would be any 
ramification of the absence of the adjective ‘alien’ or ‘enemy’ before the 
word ‘Territories’ in the title of Section I of Part III.119 Such an editorial 
change was perceived as entailing no more than a paltry effect.  
 
Indeed, the Report of Committee III to the Plenary Assembly (the “Report”) 
provides two indicia for supporting this hypothesis. First, when explaining 
the parameters of Section I of Part III, the Report expressly mentioned that 
this section would apply to ‘aliens in the territory of a belligerent State’ 
alongside “the population - national or alien - resident in a country occupied 
by the enemy”.120 Second, a more compelling indication for supporting this 
hypothesis can be extrapolated from the Report’s commentary to Article 4 of 
the Stockholm Civilians Draft (now Article 6 of the GCIV). This provision 
set forth that certain provisions would be maintained in force throughout the 
 
114  This proposal had already been refuted at Committee III; Final Record, Vol. II-B, at 377, 
23rd Plenary Meeting, 1 Aug. 1949. 
115  Id., at 380, 23rd Plenary Meeting, 1 Aug. 1949 (Mr. Ginnane, US). 
116  Bulgaria suggested that the GCIV should cover even “persons judicially prosecuted for 
espionage and sabotage”):  id., at 381-382 (Mr. Mevorah). 
117  Id., at 383 (25 votes to 9, with 6 abstentions). 
118  Id., at 383 (by 29 votes to 8, with 4 abstentions). 
119  Final Record, vol. I, at 122. 
120  Final Record, vol. II-A, at 821 (emphasis added). Admittedly, the Report did not mention 
that Sec. I of Part III would apply only to those two situations. Yet, it seems to be an 
overstatement to argue the Report implicitly recognised the applicability of this section to 
nationals captured in their homeland battlefield. 
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period of occupation. The Report stated that “[a]ll provisions of Section I of 
Part III, excepting Article 24, which only applies during active hostilities, 
would be retained”.121 Article 24 of the Stockholm Civilians Draft, part of 
which has survived to become the text of Article 28 of the GCIV, 122 
provided that “[n]o protected person may at any time be sent to, or detained 
in areas which are particularly exposed, nor may his or her presence be used 
to render certain points or areas immune from military operations”. 123 
Referring to the ‘areas which are particularly exposed’, the regulatory scope 
contemplated by Article 24 (at least by its first clause) seemed to verge on 
active combat zones.124 From the above comment of the Report, it can be 
inferred that except for Article 24, the other provisions in Section I of Part 
III of the Draft Civilians Convention were not comprehended as applicable 
to protected persons caught in battlefield (whether of their home state or of 
adversary).  
 
Subsequently, at the Diplomatic Conference, the first clause of Article 24 
was eliminated. It makes sense to suppose that this was considered out of 
tune with the remainder of Section I of Part III, which were purported to 
apply only to the situation other than that of active hostilities. Surely, one 
might counter that those other provisions of Section I of Part III were 
understood as applicable both during active combat and during the phase of 
occupation. Yet, such argument is to overread the negotiators’ purport. If 
their shared thought supported the broader coverage of the provisions of 
Section I of Part III, why should not those provisions have been introduced 
in Part II, which was intended to be wider in application to encompass 
combat zones? All in all, the preparatory work suggests that the drafters 
were largely of the opinion that the provisions of Section I of Part III, with 
the exception of Article 28 GCIV, were not destined for civilians trapped on 
battlefield.  
 
F. Overall Assessment of the Inferences Drawn from the Travaux 
Préparatoires of the GCIV in Relation to Battlefield Unprivileged 
Belligerents 
 
From the tenor of discussions of Committee III at the Diplomatic 
Conference, one can infer the negotiators’ general acknowledgement that the 
 
121  Id., at 816, (emphasis added). 
122  The Diplomatic Conference eliminated the first part of Art. 24 of the Stockholm Civilians 
Draft, which related to the transfer of the protected persons to, and their detention in, 
combat zones.  
123  Final Record, vol. I at 122. 
124  See Pictet’s Commentary to the GCIV, at 209 (explaining that Art. 28 of the GCIV 
“applies to the belligerents’ own territory as well as to occupied territory”).  
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scope of Part III of the GCIV was circumscribed only to the protected 
persons held in two situations:  the adversary’s territory and occupied 
territory.125 The majority of the negotiators did not uphold the thesis that the 
breadth of Part III of the draft Civilians Convention should be sufficient to 
cover civilians caught in (their homeland) battle zones. 126  Insofar as 
unprivileged belligerents were concerned, the prevailing assumption seemed 
to be that if applicable, the Draft Civilians Convention could be applied only 
to those captured in the two aforementioned situations. Indeed, some 
(Western) States went further, challenging the very applicability of the draft 
Civilians Convention to any unprivileged belligerents. As seen above, they 
were opposed to the wider ambit of protection suggested by Article 3 of the 
Stockholm Civilians Draft (Article 4 GCIV). In contrast, the influential 
minority opinions (proffered by the USSR and other socialist allies) suggest 
their conviction that the protections of the Draft Civilians Convention should 
be as comprehensive as possible. They seemed to contemplate the Civilians 
Convention as the safety net for all persons excluded from the framework of 
the Draft POW Convention, including battlefield unprivileged belligerents.  
 
IV. BATTLEFIELD UNPRIVILEGED BELLIGERENTS CONSIDERED 




Analyses of this section will concentrate on three specific provisions of the 
1948 Stockholm POW Draft:  Article 3(1) (Article 4A GCIII); Article 4(2) 
(Article 5 GCIII); and Article 3(3), which provided the minimum humane 
treatment for all persons falling outside the compass of any other Geneva 
Convention. With respect to the first paragraph of Article 3 of the Stockholm 
POW Draft, the historical inquiries will explore whether and, if so, to what 
extent this was understood as encompassing unprivileged belligerents. 
Turning to the third paragraph of this provision, its implications on the ambit 
of protection of the draft Civilians Convention provide ample fodder for 
inductive reasoning. This section will investigate if this paragraph was 
perceived as the only safety net for civilians trapped on a battlefield 
(including, above all, homeland battlefield unprivileged belligerents) whom, 
according to the finding of the previous section, most drafters barred from 
 
125  Final Record, vol. II-A, id., at 620-623, Committee III, 2nd meeting, 26 Apr. 1949. 
126  See the statement of Mr. Pictet at the 6th Meeting of the XVIIth International Conference 
of the Red Cross at Stockholm in 1948; Observations concernant le compte-rendu de la 
6ème séance, Projet ‘Civils’ Réduit (deposited in ICRC Archives). Even the draft 
documents unearthed at the ICRC archive and the Swiss Federal Archive (the depository 
of all the records of the 1949 Geneva Conventions) revealed no indication that such a 
thesis was sustained by most delegates. 
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the ambit of Part III of the GCIV. The negotiators’ deliberations on the text 
of Article 4(2) of the Stockholm POW Draft are of special relevance because 
most of them perceived this as the viable alternative to the third paragraph of 
Article 3 of the Stockholm POW Draft.  
 
This section will start with dissecting various proposals to expand the list 
of the POW candidates that were put forward from the Conference of 
Government Experts of 1947 (the “CGE”) to the end of the Diplomatic 
Conference. In this regard, special attention will be paid to the definition of 
partisans (organised resistance movements), and to the motions to broaden 
the scope of the levée en masse and to introduce civilian participants in 
hostilities as new POW classes. The second half of this section will 
extrapolate inferences from heated debates over the fate of Article 3(3) of 
the Stockholm POW Draft. 
 
B. Recognition of Partisans and Organized Resistance Movements at the 
Conference of Government Experts (CGE) (1947) 
 
At the CGE at Geneva (1947),127 the Second Commission, which addressed 
issues of prisoners of war, examined the conditions for partisans to qualify 
for the POW status.128  The representatives of the CGE defined the term 
‘partisans’ as “persons in occupied territory who take up arms against the 
occupying Power and its allies”.129 Among the eight proposed classes of 
persons that would benefit from the POW status listed in Section 2 of the 
CGE Report,130 partisans were featured in paragraph 4. They were defined as 
“[p]ersons in occupied territory who form a military organisation to resist the 
occupying Power and fulfil certain conditions, to be determined”. They were 
 
127  ICRC, Report of the CGE, supra note 80, at 1-2. 
128  During World War II, the ICRC, on many occasions, urged belligerent parties to accord 
POW status to enemy partisans falling into their hands, if they had respected the laws and 
customs of war;  id., at 107-108. 
129  Ibid. As noted by the delegates of the CGE, there was no treaty defining the concept of 
partisans; ICRC, Report of the CGE, supra note 80, at 107. Art. 81 of the Lieber Manual 
defines partisans as “soldiers armed and wearing the uniform of their army, but belonging 
to a corps which acts detached from the main body for the purpose of making inroads into 
the territory occupied by the enemy”. They are recognised as entitled to post-capture 
POW status. This is distinguished from a similar concept of ‘war-rebels’ in occupied 
territories. Art. 85 of the Lieber Manual defines ‘war-rebels’ as “persons within an 
occupied territory who rise in arms against the occupying or conquering army, or against 
the authorities established by the same”. According to this provision, unlike partisans, 
war-rebels are divested of the POW status in case of capture. 
130  Those eight classes correspond to the current text of Arts. 4A & 4B of the GCIII. Two 
differences were (i) the absence of the clause corresponding to Art. 4A(3); and (ii) the 
recognition of a military organisation in occupied territories; ICRC, Report of the CGE, 
supra note 80, at 103-104. 
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classified separately from independent militia or volunteer corps set forth in 
the second paragraph. 131  For most representatives at the CGE, the 
preliminary condition for the partisans to qualify for the POW status was 
that they had to form an armed or military organization.132 When discussions 
of the CGE turned on the temporal span in which the partisans had to fulfil 
specific conditions,133  the representatives were confronted with issues of 
“persons who…were employed on the land during the day and joined in 
raids by night”.134 The crux of those issues, which was all too familiar in the 
modern context of asymmetrical warfare and of the ‘revolving-door’ theory, 
hinged on the temporal scope of the question: “[f]rom what moment do 
partisans fulfil the required conditions?”135  
 
It might be argued that since the CGE Draft confined the operating sphere 
of partisans only in occupied territory, the drafting records on partisans were 
not germane to issues of battlefield unprivileged belligerents. However, as 
will be discussed below, at the subsequent Diplomatic Conference (1949), 
when the concept of ‘organised resistance movements’ was integrated into 
the specific sub-paragraph of the revised text that addressed independent 
armed units, the proposal to tie its operative sphere to an occupied territory 




C. Article 3 of the Post-CGE POW Draft in Preparation for the Stockholm 
Conference 
 
Article 3 of the post-CGE POW Draft, which was entitled ‘Prisoners of 
war’, corresponds to the current text of Articles 4A and 4B of the GCIII. It 
included the list of eight categories of persons entitled to POW status. The 
sixth sub-paragraph of Article 3(1), which related to armed organised 
movements in occupied territory, reflected the fourth paragraph of the CGE 
Report seen above. The sixth sub-paragraph of Article 3(1) recognises as 
prisoners of war: 
 
 
131  Id., at 104. Reference to ‘certain conditions’ was purported to refer, at least, to the four 
conditions derived from Art. 1 of the Hague Regulations. 
132  Id., at 109. 
133  The specific conditions suggested by the CGE were more or less the recapitulation of the 
traditional rule contained in Art. 1 of the Hague regulations: ibid., at 108. 
134  Id., at 110. 
135  Ibid. 
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(6) Persons belonging to a military organization 
constituted in an occupied territory with a view to 
combating the occupying Power, on condition: 
 
(a) that this organization has notified its participation in 
the conflict to the occupying Power, either through its 
responsible commander, or through the intermediary of a 
Party to the conflict, or that it has secured the effective, 
albeit temporary control of a determined area; 
 
(b) that its members are placed under the orders of a 
responsible commander; that they constantly wear a 
fixed distinctive emblem, recognizable at a distance; that 
they carry arms openly; that they act in obedience to the 
laws and customs of warfare; and in particular that they 
treat nationals of the occupying Power who may have 
fallen into their hands, according to the provisions of the 
present Convention.136 
 
As can be seen from this text, condition (a), which relates to the group 
requirement, consists of two alternative conditions (notification; or territorial 
control). Condition (b), which addresses the requirement for individual 
members, contains five specific conditions (the four traditional conditions 
derived from Article 1 of the 1899/1907 Hague Regulations; and the new 
requirement of reciprocity with regard to treatment of nationals of an 
occupying power).  
 
 
D. Article 3 of the Stockholm POW Draft (1948) 
 
When the post-CGE Draft texts prepared by the ICRC were approved by 
the XVIIth International Red Cross Conference at Stockholm (1948), only 
slight amendments were made. The first paragraph of Article 3 of the 
Stockholm POW Draft (the immediate precursor to Article 4 GCIII) listed 
again eight categories of potential beneficiaries of the POW status.  
 
The first paragraph of Article 3 provided that: 
 
Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, 
are persons belonging to one of the following categories, 
who have fallen into the power of the enemy: 
 
136  XVIIth International Red Cross Conference (Stockholm, Aug. 1948), ICRC 1948a, supra 
note 78, at 52-53. 
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(1) Members of the armed forces of the Parties to the 
conflict, including members of voluntary corps which are 
regularly constituted. 
(2) Members of regular armed forces who profess 
allegiance to a Government or an authority not 
recognized by the Detaining Power. 
(3) Persons who accompany the armed forces without 
actually being members thereof, such as civil members 
of military aircraft crews, war correspondents, supply 
contractors, members of labour units or of services 
responsible for the welfare of the military, provided they 
are in possession of identity cards similar to the annexed 
model and issued by the armed forces which they are 
accompanying. 
(4) Members of crews of the merchant marine of the 
Parties to the conflict who do not benefit by more 
favourable treatment, under any other provisions in 
international law. 
(5) Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory who on the 
approach of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to 
resist the invading forces, without having had time to 
form themselves into regular armed units, provided they 
carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of 
war. 
(6) Persons belonging to a military organization or to an 
organized resistance movement constituted in an 
occupied territory to resist the occupying Power, on 
condition: 
(a) that such organization has, either through its 
responsible leader, through the Government which it 
acknowledges, or through the mediation of a Party to the 
conflict, notified the occupying Power of its participating 
in the conflict. 
(b) That its members are under the command of a 
responsible leader; that they wear at all times a fixed 
distinctive emblem, recognizable at a distance; that they 
carry arms openly; that they conform to the laws and 
customs of war; and in particular, that they treat 
nationals of the occupying Power who fall in to their 
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hands in accordance with the provisions of the present 
Convention.137 
 
The second paragraph of Article 3, which has turned into the current text of 
Article 4B of the GCIII, stipulated that: 
 
The following shall likewise be treated as prisoners of 
war under the present Convention:  
(1) Persons who are, or who have been members of the 
armed forces of an occupied country, if by reason of 
such membership the occupying Power considers it 
necessary to intern them for reasons of security.  
(2) Persons belonging to one of the categories designated 
in the present Article, who have been accommodated by 
neutral or non-belligerent Powers in their territories, 
subject to the rules of international law peculiar to 
maritime warfare. The Convention shall apply to these 
persons without prejudice to any more favourable 
treatment which the said Powers may think fit to grant 
them, and with the reservation of the provisions 
contained in Articles 7, 9, 14 (par. I), 28 (par. 5), 49-57 
inclusive, 72-107 inclusive and 116. The situations 
governed by the said Articles may be made the subject of 
special agreements between the Powers concerned.138 
 
Lastly, the third paragraph of Article 3 of the Stockholm POW Draft reads 
that: 
 
The present Convention shall also provide a minimum 
standard of protection for any other category of persons 
who are captured or detained as the result of an armed 
conflict and whose protection is not specifically provided 
for in any other Convention.139 
 
With specific regard to the ‘chapeau’ of the sixth subparagraph of Article 
3(1), the salient difference from the post-CGE Draft was the inclusion of the 
concept of ‘an organised resistance movement’, and this, on an equal footing 
to a ‘military organization’. It was the Stockholm Conference that proposed 
 
137  Final Record, vol. I, at 73-74 (italics in original, suggesting the amendment done at 
Stockholm). 
138  Ibid. 
139  Ibid (the third paragraph in original written in italics, showing its adoption as an 
amendment at the Stockholm Conference). 
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the recognition of the former concept. 140  As with the post-CGE text, 
condition (a) displayed a group requirement while condition (b) addressed an 
individual prerequisite. Yet, unlike the post-CGE text, subparagraph (a) 
eliminated the condition of territorial control.  
 
What was most noteworthy of the Stockholm POW Draft was the 
introduction of the third paragraph to Article 3, which was proposed by the 
US delegation.141 The question how this ‘minimum protection clause’ was 
perceived by the negotiators is closely interwoven with that of applicability 
of the Civilians Convention to the battlefield unprivileged belligerents. The 
analytical prism of the subsequent investigations will fixate on the key 
question highlighted earlier, namely, whether it was this clause of the 
Stockholm POW Draft (rather than the Draft GCIV) that the negotiators 
regarded as the safety net for any person that would fall outside the purview 
of the GCIII.  
 
E. Different Proposals to Expand the POW Candidates under Article 
3(1) of the Stockholm POW Draft at the Diplomatic Conference and 
Their Implications on Battlefield Unprivileged Belligerents 
 
1. Overall Remarks 
 
At Committee II of the Diplomatic Conference (which was assigned to 
examine the Stockholm POW Draft)142 there were protracted discussions on 
Article 3 of the Stockholm POW Draft. Two internal subcommittees were 
set up:  a Special Committee assigned to deal with specific provisions 
(including Articles 3 of the Stockholm POW Draft)143 and a Working Party 
entrusted by the latter to examine the question of organized resistance 
movements laid down in the sixth subparagraph of Article 3(1).144 At the 
Special Committee of Committee II, three salient approaches to broadening 
the scope of the POW beneficiaries under Article 3(1) of the Stockholm 
Draft were discernible. Two approaches were purported to extend the 
parameters of two different classes of persons that were already entitled to 
 
140  Id., at 51. A ‘military organisation’ in occupied territory had been introduced as a new 
class of belligerents for the first time in the fourth paragraph of the CGE Report (and 
transposed to the sixth paragraph of post-CGE text). A footnote to that sub-paragraph 
explains that the requirement of territorial control by such a ‘military organisation’ was 
obliterated at the Stockholm Conference; id., at 52-53. See also Final Record, vol. II-A, at 
240. 
141  See Final Record, vol. II-A, at 431, 433, Special Committee of Committee II, 7th Meeting, 
19 May 1949 (General Parker, US, and Mr. Wilhelm, ICRC). 
142  The Committee II held 36 meetings, stretching from 25 April to 22 July 1949. 
143  Final Record, vol. II-A, at 413. 
144  Id., at 423-424. 
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the POW status under the Stockholm POW Draft. These were: (1) the 
proposal to facilitate members of organised resistance movements to acquire 
the POW status by easing the conditions; and (2) the motion to extend the 
operative sphere of the levée en masse. The third approach was to create an 
entirely new class of the POW candidates, civilians defending against the 
adversary in an unorganised and unspontaneous manner in their homeland in 
the throes of invasion. As will be explained below, only the first proposal 
proved to be successful.145 
 
2. The Proposal to Introduce the Organised Resistance Movement as a Sub-
category of Independent Militia or Volunteer Corps 
 
As seen above, in the sixth subparagraph of Article 3(1) of the Stockholm 
POW Draft, the ‘organised resistance movement’ was already introduced 
alongside a ‘military organization’ as a new class of persons entitled to the 
POW status. What was distinctive (albeit modestly) about the proposal in the 
Special Committee was that an organised resistance movement was 
introduced as a subcategory of independent militia or volunteer corps, rather 
than as an autonomous genre of the POW beneficiaries. Further, the 
conditions laid down in that subparagraph were eased. The text proposed and 
adopted along this line now features as Article 4A(2) GCIII. 
 
In the Special Committee, its Rapporteur revised the entire text of Article 
3(1) of the Stockholm POW Draft.146 The first subparagraph was modified to 
chime in with Article 9 of the Brussels Declaration (1874)147 and Article 1 of 
the Hague Regulations, referring explicitly to the four established conditions. 
This subparagraph read: 
 
(1) members of armed forces who are in the service of an 
adverse belligerent, as well as members of militia or 
volunteer corps belonging to such belligerent, and 
fulfilling the following conditions: 
(a) That of being commanded by a person responsible for 
his subordinates; 
(b) That of wearing a fixed distinctive sign recognizable 
at a distance; 
(c) That of carrying arms openly; 
 
145  This is incorporated into the text of Art. 4A(2) of the GCIII. 
146  Final Record, vol. II-A, at 465, Special Committee of Committee II, 21st meeting, 23 Jun. 
1949. 
147  The Brussels Project of an International Declaration concerning the Laws and Customs of 
War (Brussels, 27 Aug. 1874). 
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(d) That of conducting their operations in accordance 
with the laws and customs of war.148 
 
Later at the Special Committee, Chairperson of the Working Party split the 
first subparagraph of Article 3(1) of the Working Text into two 
subparagraphs.149 Presumably, he must have sensed that this draft provision 
failed to differentiate between the members of integrated militia (or 
volunteer corps) and those of independent militia (or volunteer corps), i.e., 
the binary structure that had already been recognized since the Brussels 
Declaration. After this revision, those two subparagraphs read: 
 
(1) Members of armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as 
well as members of militia or volunteer corps belonging 
to these armed forces; 
(2) Members of other militia or other volunteer corps of 
that Party to the conflict who fulfil the following 
conditions: . …150 
 
This decision necessitated the renumbering of the ensuing four (third to 
sixth) subparagraphs of Article 3(1).151 Subsequently, in order to eliminate 
the new seventh (ex-sixth) subparagraph whose reference to the four 
conditions of Article 1 of the Hague Regulations (1907) were duplicated in 
the new second subparagraph,152  the Working Party expressly mentioned 
organized resistance movements as a subcategory of the independent militia 
in the latter subparagraph. 153  The new second subparagraph, which was 




148  Final Record, vol. II-A, at 465, Special Committee of Committee II, 21st meeting, 23 Jun. 
1949. 
149  Id., at 477, Special Committee of Committee II, 25th meeting, 5 Jul. 1949. 
150  Ibid. 
151  While this Working Text resulted in duplicating the four classic POW conditions in the 
second subparagraph (addressing independent militia or volunteer corps) and in the new 
seventh subparagraph (sixth subparagraph under the Stockholm Draft), no action was 
immediately taken; id., at 465, Special Committee of Committee II, 21st meeting, 23rd Jun. 
1949. 
152 This was in accordance with the Dutch proposal that the sixth paragraph (or seventh 
paragraph of the Working Text) be eliminated; id., at 469, 478 & 479, Special Committee 
of Committee II, 22nd meeting, 24 Jun. 1949; 25th meeting, 5 Jul. 1949; and 26th meeting, 
7 Jul. 1949. 
153  This was, for a brief period, renumbered as the seventh sub-paragraph; id., at 479, Special 
Committee of Committee II, 26th Meeting, 7 Jul. 1949. See also id., at 386-389, 
Committee II, 30th Meeting, 12 Jul. 1949. 
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Members of militias and voluntary corps, including those 
of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party 
to the conflict and operating in or outside their own 
territory even if this territory is occupied, provided that 
these militias or voluntary corps, including these 
organized resistance movements, fulfil the following 
conditions:…(the four conditions remaining 
unaltered).154 
 
This new second subparagraph, when compared with the sixth 
subparagraph of Article 3(1) of the Stockholm Draft, reveals two salient 
differences. First, it obliterated the requirement of both notification and 
territorial control. It streamlined the requirement, focusing only on the four 
conditions derived from Article 1 of the Hague Regulations. Second, as 
briefly noted above, any requirement that such irregular armed groups be 
connected to an occupied territory was removed to cover combat zones as 
their operative spheres, the aspect that was of special pertinence to 
“organised battlefield unprivileged belligerents”. [Emphasis added].  
 
3. The Proposed Concept of a ‘New Category of Levée en Masse’  
 
The second approach proposed at Special Committee of Committee II was 
the aborted attempt to expand the scope of levée en masse to cover different 
forms of unorganised resistance while maintaining the condition of carrying 
arms openly. One such proposal was to recognise a mass civilian rising that 
would occur without spontaneity “in response to an order broadcast by a 
government or by a military chief”. 155  However, this proposal was 
defeated156 owing to the risk of jeopardising the security of combatants.157 
Another suggestion was to recognise a mass civilian rising in the presence of 
the occupying forces.158 Yet, this failed to clarify the meaning of the phrase 
‘the presence of an occupying power’. There was a further proposition to 
 
154  Id., at 479, Special Committee of Committee II, 26th meeting, 7 Jul. 1949. Its adoption (by 
14 votes to nil) resulted in the elimination of the seventh subparagraph. In the same 
meeting, the Special Committee made some cosmetic changes, adding: (i) the word 
‘other’ before the words ‘militias’ and ‘volunteer corps’; and (ii) the words ‘those of’ 
between the words ‘including’ and ‘organized resistance movements’; ibid. Such changes 
were purported to highlight that this sub-paragraph would deal with 
irregular/independent militia or volunteer corps. 
155  Id., at 420, Special Committee of Committee II, 3rd Meeting, 12 May 1949 (Major 
Steinberg, Israel). 
156  Id., at 421 (7 votes to 3). 
157  Id., at 420 (Mr. Gardner, UK). 
158  Id., at 421 (Mr. Baistrocchi, Italy). See also ibid., at 435, Special Committee of 
Committee II, 8th Meeting, 23 May 1949 (Mr. Gardner, UK). 
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extend the levée en masse to cover the civilian population fighting during the 
‘first period of occupation’. This proposed new (seventh) class of the POW 
candidates159 was intended to ‘protect civilian populations which continued 
fighting under enemy occupation’, namely, ‘combatants who had no time to 
organize themselves, and ran the risk thereby of being treated as francs-
tireurs’. 160  The importance of this motion was to underscore practical 
difficulty in demarcating the line between the end of the invasion phase and 
the beginning of the phase of occupation.161 However, its deficiency was the 
similar ambiguity in delimiting ‘the first period of occupation’.162 Overall, 
all of those three proposals to (over)stretch the definitional scope of levée en 
masse to cover civilians engaged in unorganised armed resistance even in the 
phase of occupation (or in the transitional phase) was unable to override the 
preponderant objection that if civilians wished to continue resistance they 
had to form an organised armed unit (an independent militia or volunteer 
corps). Otherwise, in the mind of most delegates, there loomed substantial 




4. The Danish Proposal to Add ‘Civilians’ Defending their Country against 
Invading Forces  
 
The third noteworthy approach was to propose that POW rights be 
extended to unorganised participants in hostilities, namely, to ‘civilians’ who 
got involved in armed resistance against invading forces without, however, 
referring to the condition of bearing weapons openly. Earlier at Committee 
II, the Danish delegate had expressed concern over the insufficient 
protection provided by sub-paragraph 6 of Article 3(1) of the Stockholm 
POW Draft in relation to two specific kinds of civilians: civilians acting in 
self-defence against ‘illegal acts’, and patriotic civilians participating in the 
defence of their country ‘in the event of aggression or of illegal 
 
159  Id., at 422 (Major Steinberg, Israel). This amendment read that “[i]nhabitants who, having 
taken up arms in the conditions provided by sub-paragraph (5), continue to resist during 
the first period of occupation, without having had the possibility of setting up an 
Organization in conformity with the conditions set forth in sub-paragraph (6), provided 
they carry arms openly and conform to the laws and customs of war. 
160  Ibid. 
161  See the comment by the Soviet delegate (Mr. Morosov), ibid. at 421, Special Committee 
of Committee II, 3rd meeting, 12 May 1949. 
162  As criticized by the US (Mr. Yingling) and the UK delegates (Mr. Gardner). This was 
defeated by seven votes to three; ibid. See also Report of Committee II to the Plenary 
Assembly of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva, id., at 562. 
163  See Special Committee of Committee II, 3rd Meeting, 12 May 1949, id., at 422 (Mr. 
Yingling, US; and Mr. Gardner, UK). 
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occupation’. 164  His amendment, which introduced those new POW 
beneficiaries to the proposed (seventh) sub-paragraph of Article 3(1),165 was 
a verbose, clumsy cocktail comprised not only of the conditions for their 
qualification, but also of references to some human rights, including the ban 
on summarily shooting captives in a zone of invasion. In the Special 
Committee of Committee II, presumably inspired by Article 4 of the 
Stockholm Draft (now Article 5 GCIII), 166  Denmark proposed to ensure 
procedural safeguard of captives, contemplating ‘an impartial Court’ that 
would determine their status and treatment in case of doubt.167 This proposal, 
while gaining a considerable purchase from the USSR and other States,168 
was doomed. It met with the ‘mainstream’ criticism that this would 
emasculate the distinction between combatants and non-combatants in the 
traditional Hague rules. 169  In the end, the Danish delegate himself 
countermanded this proposal.170  
 
Still, it is worth inquiring into the debates surrounding the abandoned 
Danish amendment, as they helped infer the negotiators’ thought on how the 
GCIV’s parameters of protection should be demarcated in its correlation to 
the Stockholm POW Draft. When several delegates suggested that the 
Danish proposal should be more adequately dealt with in the context of the 
 
164  Id., at 240, Committee II, 2nd meeting, 26 Apr. 1949 (Mr. Cohn, Denmark). As the new 
class of persons eligible for the POW status, the Danish proposal referred to “[c]ivilians 
acting in lawful defence against unlawful acts, or who defend themselves against other 
aggressions on the part of belligerents, for instance in defending the lives, health or living 
conditions of persons, or property, against enemy aggression or who participate in the 
defence of their country against illegal aggression or occupation”;  ibid. As an aside, the 
obligation by the occupying power to respect the sense of ‘patriotism’ of the local 
population was expressly recognised in Part IV, Art. 3 of the 1934 Draft Convention 
adopted in Monaco (Sanitary Cities and Localities). See M. Inazumi, “Bunmin no Hogo” 
(“Civilian Protection”), in Buryoku-funso no Kokusai-ho (International Law of Armed 
Conflict), (S. Murase & Z. Mayama eds, 2004) 531-557, at 537, 555.  
165  Final Record, vol. III (Annexes), at 58-59, No. 85. See also Final Record, vol. II-A, at 
240, Committee II, 2nd Meeting, 26 Apr. 1949. 
166  This required the legal status of doubtful captives to be determined by ‘a responsible 
authority’; Final Record, vol. II-A, at 425-426, Special Committee of Committee II, 5th 
Meeting, 16 May 1949, (Mr. Cohn, Denmark). 
167  Ibid. 
168  Id, at 426, Special Committee of Committee II, 5th Meeting, 16 May 1949 (See, above all, 
the statement by General Slavin, USSR and Major Steinberg, Israel). 
169  Ibid., Special Committee of Committee II, 5th Meeting, 16 May 1949 (Miss Gutteridge, 
UK; General Devijver of Belgium; General Dillon, US; and Captain Mouton, 
Netherlands). See also ibid., at 434, Special Committee of Committee II, 8th Meeting, 23 
May 1949 (Mr. Stroehlin, Switzerland). 
170  Id., at 435-436 (submitting a new amendment to Art. 3), Special Committee of Committee 
II, 9th Meeting, 23 May 1949. 
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Civilians Convention,171 the Danish representative was adamant that he had 
no intention to submit his amendment to Committee III (the committee that, 
as seen above, was assigned to draft the Civilians Convention). This was 
because “in his opinion it referred solely to the Prisoners of War 
Convention”. 172  Focusing exclusively on the draft POW Convention, he 
seemed to be convinced that ‘civilians’ taking up arms and captured in a 
combat zone of their territory should be governed by the POW Convention, 
and not by the Civilians Convention.173  As a corollary, according to his 
assumption, such ‘homeland battlefield unprivileged belligerents’ would fall 
outside the ambit of the draft Civilians Convention. In contrast, as an 
alternative possible inference, it might be reasoned that when insisting that 
his amendment be submitted to the draft POW Convention, the Danish 
Delegate did not necessarily exclude the possibility of the draft Civilians 
Convention covering the kind of battlefield unprivileged belligerents that he 
had in mind. According to this hypothesis, the Danish representative may 
have believed that such persons should be entitled to supplementary 
protections under the POW Convention on top of the Civilians Convention. 





F. The ‘Minimum Protection Clause’ Contained in the Third Paragraph of 
Article 3 of the Stockholm POW Draft  
 
1. General Remarks 
 
It has been explained that the third paragraph of Article 3 of the Stockholm 
POW Draft was purported as the ‘minimum protection clause’ or the gap-
filler for all captives falling outside any of the eight classes of persons 
mentioned under Article 3(1) and (2). As discussed above, the crux is to 
explore whether the delegates believed this ‘minimum protection clause’ to 
be the only safety net for unprivileged belligerents failing to satisfy the POW 
conditions under the Stockholm POW Draft (in particular, for those captured 
on their homeland battlefield).174 If that proves to have been the case, this 
can be brought to enervate the hypothesis that the negotiators believed the 
GCIV to be all-embracing. In the end, the third paragraph of Article 3 did 
 
171  Id., at 426, Special Committee of Committee II, 5th Meeting, 16 May 1949 (General 
Dillon, US; Captain Mouton, Netherlands). See also id., at 434, Special Committee of 
Committee II, 8th Meeting (Mr. Baistrocchi, Italy and Mr Stroehlin, Switzerland). 
172  Id., at 427, Special Committee of Committee II, 5th Meeting, 16 May 1949. 
173  See, e.g., Callen, supra note 1 at 1055-60. 
174  Id., at 1055-1065. 
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not muster enough support to survive, with even its originator (the US) 
coming to abandon it.175 
 
2. The ‘Minimum Protection Clause’ Discussed at Committee II 
 
At Committee II, the UK proposed the expurgation of the third paragraph 
of Article 3, submitting an alternative text that addressed ‘members of 
partisan organizations’ and their conditions for the POW status. 176  The 
amendment contemplated the case where partisans would be captured other 
than in an occupied territory. Yet, it excluded combat zones of their home 
State. 177  While no elaborate rationale was presented by delegates who 
endorsed the UK proposal rather indolently,178 Denmark put prime emphasis 
on its gap-filling role for all participants in hostilities who would not qualify 
for the POW status.179 His insistence on preserving this clause corroborates 
his belief that the coverage of the GCIV was woefully wanting with respect 
to ‘civilians’ involved in armed resistance against invaders in their home 
territory. Here again, it seems far-fetched to speculate that the Danish 
strategy was to obtain for such unprivileged belligerents the supplementary 
safeguard of the GCIII alongside the safety net already provided by the 
GCIV.180 
 
3. The ‘Minimum Protection Clause’ Discussed at Special Committee of 
Committee II 
 
When the locus of examinations of the ‘minimum protection clause’ shifted 
to the Special Committee (of Committee II), the delegates were again 
polarised. On one hand, the ‘retentionist’ camp led by Denmark considered 
this clause vital for shielding the kind of irregular participants in hostilities 
contemplated by its delegate from inhuman treatment or summary 
 
175  Final Record, vol. II-A, at 431, Special Committee of Committee II, 7th Meeting, 19 May 
1949 (General Parker). 
176  By highlighting the requirement of an armed organisation, it excluded lonely ‘freedom 
fighters’ taking up arms and captured on a battlefield. 
177  Final Record, vol. III (Annexes), at 60, No. 89. 
178  Final Record, Vol. II-A, at 242-243, Committee II, 3rd meeting, 27 Apr. 1949 (Mr. 
Gardner, UK; Mr. Baistrocchi, Italy; General Parker, US; and Mr. Bellan, France). The 
only possible exception was Belgium that invoked the risk of undermining the primary 
purpose of according effective safeguards to resistance movements through uncertain 
expansion of POW candidates (General Devijver, Belgium). 
179  See also ibid. (Mr. Szabó, Hungary; and General Sklyarov, USSR). 
180  Indeed, as seen above, the Danish delegate was actively engaged in securing, albeit 
without success, civilian participants in defensive acts of hostilities as an additional POW 
candidate. This shows that he considered the GCIV insufficient to safeguard the kind of 
persons he had in mind. 
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execution. 181  Endorsing this clause, the USSR delegation articulated its 
conviction that the personal scope of the POW Convention ought to be set as 
broad as possible.182 On the other hand, the ‘abolitionists’ with respect to the 
third paragraph of Article 3 criticised this clause for impairing the textual 
integrity of Article 3 of the Stockholm POW Draft, which was earmarked 
first and foremost for defining the classes of persons entitled to the POW 
status. More cogently, they objected to a general clause of protection in the 
very provision defining qualifications for the POW status. In their view, this 
would disincentivize fighters to comply with the POW conditions while 
undermining the security of the ‘regulars’.183 Of special interest on this score 
is the stance of the ICRC representative.184 Counter-intuitive as it may be, 
his opinion was scarcely receptive to the idea of affording protections of the 
Civilians or the POW Draft to unprivileged belligerents.185 He went so far as 
to suggest that “[a]lthough the two Conventions [GCIII and GCIV] might 
appear to cover all the categories concerned, irregular belligerents were not 
actually protected’. 186  Indeed, his scepticism over the place of the 
unprivileged belligerents under the Geneva Conventions was bolstered by 
his parallel doubt over giving protections to “persons who did not conform 
to the laws and customs of war”. 
 
4. Three Solutions Suggested by the Working Party with Regard to the Third 
Paragraph of Article 3 of the Stockholm POW Draft 
 
In the Special Committee of Committee II, faced with the impasse of the 
debates surrounding the fate of the third paragraph of Article 3 of the 
Stockholm POW Draft, the chairperson of the Working Party proposed three 
possible options.187 The first proposal was to replace it by the text of the first 
paragraph of Article 3A submitted by the Netherlands. That paragraph read 
that “[s]hould any doubt arise whether a person resisting the enemy belongs 
to any of the categories enumerated above, such person shall enjoy the 
 
181  Final Record, vol. II-A, at 433, Special Committee of Committee II, 7th Meeting, 19 May 
1949 (Mr. Cohn, Denmark). 
182  See ibid., at 433-434 (General Slavin, USSR and Mr. Falus, Hungary). 
183  Id., at 433-434 (Mr. Gardner, UK). See also ibid. (General Devijver, Belgium; Mr. 
Stroehlin, Switzerland; and Mr. Wilhelm, ICRC); Committee II, 35th Meeting, 20 July 
1949 (Mr. Gardner, UK) at 408. 
184  According to the ICRC, while some isolated cases might justify a ‘general clause of 
protection’ like the Martens clause, it was inadvisable to enumerate ‘irregular 
belligerents’ in the provision defining who would qualify for POW status; id., at 433 (Mr. 
Wilhelm). 
185  Id., at 433, Special Committee of Committee II, 7th Meeting, 19 May 1949 (Mr. Wilhelm, 
ICRC, opining that it was “uncertain which category of persons it was desired to cover”). 
186  Ibid., (Mr. Wilhelm, ICRC). 
187  Id., at 480, Special Committee of Committee II, 26th Meeting, 7 Jul. 1949. 
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protection of the present Convention until such time as their status has been 
determined by the competent authorities”.188  The special hallmark of the 
Dutch proposed text was to give the conditional and stopgap safeguards of 
the GCIII, with those safeguards applicable only where there is doubt about 
their status and only pending such status-determination. The second solution 
was to add the second paragraph of ‘Article 3A’ of the Netherlands’ 
amendment,189 whose tenor was aspirational and evocative of the Martens 
Clause.190 The third option was to maintain the third paragraph of Article 3 
of the Stockholm POW Draft. For the voting procedure, the Chairperson of 
the Working Party proposed that at first the delegates at Special Committee 
were invited to elect between the first solution on one hand, and the second 
or third solution on the other.191 In the vote, the Special Committee adopted 
the first option.192 The delegates then decided against inserting a separate 
clause based on the above second option or retaining the third paragraph of 
Article 3.193 In the hindsight, the Working Party’s proposal was anomalous. 
It looked poised to prearrange the Dutch amendment as the first pick. It 
clearly disfavoured the third option (retaining the third paragraph). Under 
this procedure, the third option was relegated to a contingency that availed 
itself only after the first proposal was ousted.  
 
G. The Adoption of the Text of Article 3 of the Stockholm POW Draft by 
Committee II 
 
At Special Committee of Committee II, the third paragraph of Article 3 of 
the Stockholm POW Draft was blotted out in favour of the Netherlands’ 
 
188  Final Record, vol. III (Annexes), at 63, Annex No. 94 (the Dutch amendment to Arts. 3, 
3A and 4 of 3 Jun. 1949). 
189  Ibid. 
190  This provided that “[e]ven in cases where the decision of the above–mentioned authorities 
would not allow these persons to benefit under the present Convention, they shall 
nevertheless remain under the safeguard and rule of the principles of international law as 
derived from the usages prevailing among civilized nations, of human rights and the 
demands of the public conscience.”; id., at 63, Annex No. 94. There was also an 
alternative option to add the text proposed by Denmark in its previous amendment:  Final 
Record, vol. II-A, at 480, Special Committee of Committee II, 26th Meeting, 7 Jul. 1949. 
191  Ibid. In contrast, the USSR endorsed the third option, proposing again that the new 
category of persons mentioned in the Danish amendment (civilian defenders during an 
invasion phase) be specifically spelled out in the third paragraph of Art. 3(1); ibid. 
192  Ibid (by 9 votes to 1). The text was amended by the French proposal to delete the words 
“or by a competent military authority with officer’s rank”; ibid. 
193  Ibid. (by 10 votes to 4). The Danish delegate requested the Summary Record of the 
Meeting to mention that no objection was raised against his proposal, according to which 
“Article 3 should not be interpreted in such a way as to deprive persons, not covered by 
the provisions [sic] of Article 3, of their human rights or of their right of self-defence 
against illegal acts”; ibid., at 481. 
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amendment, which contained the substance of the second paragraph of 
Article 4 of the Stockholm text (relating to the determination of the status of 
doubtful captives). 194  The new third paragraph of Article 3, adopted by 
Special Committee of Committee II, read that “[s]hould any doubt arise 
whether persons resisting to the enemy belong to any of the categories 
enumerated above, such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present 
Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a military 
tribunal”. At Committee II, the ICRC representative195 spotted the similarity 
between this amendment to the third paragraph of Article 3 and the second 
paragraph of Article 4 of the Stockholm Draft (now Article 5(2) GCIII).196 
Needless to say, the resemblance of those two paragraphs should not come 
as a surprise. The very purport of the Netherlands’ amendment submitted to 
Special Committee was to incorporate the substance of Article 4(2) into the 
third paragraph of Article 3 of the Stockholm POW Draft!197  
 
When adopting the text of Article 3 as a whole,198 Committee II confirmed 
the elimination of the revised third paragraph. 199  As summarised in the 
Report of the Committee II submitted to the Plenary Assembly, 200  the 
Netherlands’ amendment served as the last nails in the coffin of the 
‘minimum protection clause’ of generic nature. Further, as a result of the 
Dutch proposal (Article 3A) as briefly discussed above, Article 4(2) of the 
Draft POW Convention (Article 5(2) GCIII) was transformed into a rule of 
tentative damage control. Under this provision, the parameters of the 
GCIV’s protection were circumscribed only to the captives whose legal 
status was doubtful, and this, only so long as their status was ascertained by 
a competent court.  
 
194  Ibid. 
195  Id., at 388 (Mr. Wilhelm, ICRC). 
196  Id., at 245, Committee II, 4th Meeting, 28 Apr. 1949. The second paragraph of Art. 4 of 
the Stockholm POW Draft read that “[s]hould any doubt arise whether one of the 
aforesaid persons belongs to any of the categories named in the said Article, the said 
person shall have the benefit of the present Convention until his or her status has been 
determined by a responsible authority”.  Final Record, vol. I, at 74. 
197  Referring to the problem of this overlap, the USSR proposed the restoration of the third 
paragraph of Art. 3 of the Stockholm POW Draft. Final Record, vol. II-A, at 388, 
Committee II, 30th Meeting, 12 Jul. 1949 (General Slavin, USSR). 
198  Ibid., at 388-389 (by 28 votes to nil, with 1 abstention; 12 Jul. 1949). See Projet d’article 
adopté par la Commission II le 12 juillet 1949, Conférence Diplomatique de Genève), 
CDG/PRIS.Art.3, 12 juillet 1949, CDG/PLEN.41, Pris, 20 Jul. 1949, at 1-2 (deposited at 
the Swiss Federal Archive). 
199  Ibid (by 10 to 25). Both the first and the second paragraphs of Art. 3 were voted with no 
objection (31 votes to nil, with 1 abstention for the former; and 33 votes to nil, with 1 
abstention for the latter):  ibid., at 388-389. 
200  Final Record, vol. II-A, at 559-615, Report of Committee II to the Plenary Assembly of 
the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva (23 Jul. 1949). 
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H. Deliberations on Article 3 of the Draft POW Convention at the 
Plenary Assembly  
At the Plenary, where the entire text of the POW Convention was 
presented, the whole text of Article 3 of the Draft POW Convention was 
adopted resoundingly. 201  Still, what little discussion there was of this 
provision at the Plenary were instrumental in speculating one of the most 
vocal negotiators’ thinking of the coverage of the GCIV.202 It was the same 
Danish delegate that undeterredly revisited the issue of the right of a civilian 
population to defend against an aggressor in a combat zone of their state.203 
By proposing such a new class of the POW candidacy, the Danish delegate 
indicated a rather radical view. It asserted that ‘[t]he categories named in 
Article 3 [of the Stockholm POW Draft] cannot be regarded as exhaustive, 
and [that] it should not be inferred that other persons would not also have the 
right to be treated as prisoners of war’.204 His suggestion that Article 3 of the 
Stockholm POW Draft provided an open-ended list of the POW candidates 
is hard to sustain. It is unclear whether, more than a quarter-century before 
the landmark decision of the ICJ in Nicaragua, 205  the Danish delegate 
contemplated the two-fold theses that there existed a parallel customary rule 
governing the same subject matter, and that this admitted of broader classes 
of persons eligible for the POW rights. A safer inference is that the Danish 
delegate laid out such an interpretation precisely because of his scepticism 
over the comprehensive coverage of the Civilians Draft and over its aid to 
‘civilian’ defenders against aggressors on their homeland battlefield.206  
 
I. ‘Battlefield Unprivileged Belligerents’ Discussed in the Context of 
Article 4 of the Stockholm POW Draft (Article 5 GCIII) at the 
Plenary 
 
At Plenary, the question whether the GCIV could serve as a gap-filler for 
battlefield unprivileged belligerents resurfaced in relation to Article 4 of the 
Stockholm POW Draft (Article 5 GCIII). This provision contemplated a 
tribunal assigned to determine the status of captives of doubtful nature. At 
the 13th plenary meeting, when submitting an amendment to Article 4(2) of 
 
201  Final Record, vol. II-B, at 342, 20th Plenary Meeting, 29 Jul. 1949 (by 33 votes nem. con. 
with 3 abstentions). 
202  Id., at 267-269, 13th Plenary Meeting, 26 Jul. 1949.  
203  Id., at 268 (Mr. Cohn, Denmark), 
204  Ibid. 
205  ICJ, Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 
(Nicaragua v. United States), ICJ Reports 1986, at 14, para. 176 (recognising the 
customary law equivalent of the treaty-based rule on the right of self-defence laid down in 
Art. 51 of the UN Charter). 
206  Callen, supra note 1, at 1055-60. 
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the Draft POW Convention, 207  the Netherlands delegate provided the 
following observation that went beyond the bounds of the GCIII and 
ventured into the terrain of the GCIV:   
 
That persons who do not fall under Article 3 [now Article 4, GCIII] are 
automatically protected by other Conventions is certainly untrue. The 
Civilians Convention, for instance, deals only with civilians under certain 
circumstances; such as civilians in an occupied country or civilians who are 
living in a belligerent country, but it certainly does not protect civilians who 
are in the battlefield, taking up arms against the adverse party. These 
people, if they do not belong to Article 3, and if they fall into the hands of the 
adverse party, might be shot and that is a decision which we do not want to 
leave in the hands of one man.208 
 
The tenor of the Dutch representative’s statement confirms his working 
assumption: the applicability of the GCIV only to civilians living in the 
territory of a party to the conflict or finding themselves in occupied territory, 
to the exclusion of unprivileged belligerents trapped in a combat zone. Two 
crucial corollaries can be drawn from this premise:  (1) denying the GCIV 
the role of the ‘safety-net’ for persons excluded from the ambit of the GCIII; 
and (2) possible recognition of the third distinct category of persons outside 
the combatants-civilians binary, to which battlefield unprivileged 
belligerents (whether captured in their home territory or in enemy territory) 
would appertain. Admittedly, the Dutch delegate’s thinking of the GCIV, 
which transpired in the context of the Draft POW Convention, was more or 
less consistent with the ICRC’s Tokyo Civilians Draft (1934) and Draft 
submitted to the CGE (1947), and even with the Report of Committee III to 
the Plenary.209  Yet, the residential requirement appended to situation (i) 
made the Dutch view more restrictive than what may have been implied by 
most of the precursory texts. The civilians falling into hands of the adversary 
in the combat zone not only of their own state, but also of that adversary 
where they did not abode,210 would be debarred from benefiting from the 
GCIV.  
 
207  The main differences from the Stockholm Draft lay in the determination of their status by 
a ‘military tribunal’ rather than by a non-judicial authority to avoid arbitrary decisions by 
a local commander. 
208  Final Record, vol. II-B, at 271, emphasis added (Captain Mouton, Netherlands). See also 
id., at 270-271 (arguing that if the military commander of the spot determined that a 
captive did not appertain to any of the classes of persons mentioned in Art. 3, “he will be 
considered to be a franc tireur and be put against the wall and shot on the spot”). 
209  Final Record, vol. II-A, at 821. 
210  Such non-resident foreign nationals of a belligerent party might find themselves in the 
territory of their adversary after crossing the border into that territory by whatever 
modality.  
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One remaining question is if one can deduce from the Dutch delegate’s 
assumption, which placed all battlefield unprivileged belligerents outside the 
ambit of the GCIV, the conclusion that even non-armed civilians who got 
captured in a combat zone would also be excluded. On closer scrutiny, one 
should pay closer heed to the Dutch delegate’s remark that ‘The Civilians 
Convention …does not protect civilians who are in the battlefield, taking up 
arms against the adverse party’. The italicised words suggest that in the 
Dutch delegate’s opinion, such armed participation in hostilities might have 
been regarded as an additional condition before a detaining power could 
deny captives the civilian status. On this reading, it can be argued that the 
Dutch delegate did not necessarily endorse the preclusion of unarmed 
civilians caught on a battlefield, insofar as they were resident in a belligerent 
counry. 
 
Be that as it may, at the same Plenary, the Dutch delegate’s narrower 
understanding of the Civilians Convention quoted above prodded the Soviet 
delegate’s robust counter-proposal: 
 
With regard to the … point …that any person not protected by the 
provisions of Article 3 (that is to say, any person not recognized as a 
prisoner of war), should be shot...I do not know of any law to this effect, and 
I do not know of anybody who would wish to devise a clause of that kind. 
That argument…is not valid. If a person is not recognized as a prisoner of 
war under the terms of Article 3, such a person would then be a civilian and 
would enjoy the full protection afforded by the Civilians Convention.211 
 
In view of such robust opposition to the Dutch statement212 any suggestion 
that the delegates at the Diplomatic Conference tacitly acknowledged the 
restrictive ambit of the GCIV proposed by the Dutch delegate is flawed.213 
The USSR’s above statement evinced his foresight that the Geneva 
Conventions were built on the combatant-civilian dualist premise, allowing 
for no third category of persons. 214  Hence, akin to the subseuqent 
comprehensive approach of the Additional Protocol I to defining the concept 
 
211  Final Record, vol. II-B, at 271, 13th Plenary Meeting, 26 Jul. 1949, (emphasis added) (Mr. 
Morosov, USSR). 
212  As noted by Hersch Lauterpacht, “in the atmosphere of international conferences an 
unpalatable proposal or interpretation is not always expressly rejected…[but] [f]requently 
they are merely ignored by others; at times the delegates are not sufficiently acquainted 
with the intricacies of the situation to grasp and to reply to the implications of a subtle 
declaration”.  Lauterpacht, supra n 13, at 582. 
213  Callen, supra note 1, at 1061-62. 
214  Compare Final Record, vol. II-A, at 621-622, Committee III, 2nd Meeting, 26 Apr. 1949 
(Luxembourg proposal). 
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of ‘civilians’,215 the Soviet delegate’s approach seemed to furnish ‘water-
tight’ safeguards admitting of no lacunae. His approach encompassed all the 
unprivileged belligerents falling into an adversary’s hands in a combat zone. 
Still, when the Plenary adopted the Netherlands’ amendment to Article 4 of 
the Stockholm POW Draft as modified by the Danish proposal, no 
consideration was given to the Soviet proposal.216  
 
J. Overall Assessment of the Inferences Drawn from the Travaux 
Préparatoires of the GCIII –the GCIV as the Safety-net for All Falling 
Outside the GCIII? 
 
The foregoing investigations into the travaux of the GCIII show that the 
majority of both the ‘abolitionists’ and some of the ‘retentionists’ in relation 
to the third paragraph of Article 3 of the Stockholm POW Draft were united 
in considering the GCIV’s scope short of comprehensiveness. They seemed 
to rule out civilians trapped on their homeland battlefield from the compass 
of Part III of the GCIV. On one hand, most delegates that voted to abolish 
this paragraph were motivated by the tenet that extending the protection of 
the GCIV to civilians caught in a combat zone would risk blurring the 
distinction between combatants and civilians. On the other hand, the 
underlying assumption of some staunch ‘retentionists’ such as the Danish 
delegation seemed to be that it was this ‘minimum protection clause’, not the 
GCIV, that should serve to fill any lacunae. As discussed above, he even 
strove hard to introduce a supplementary safeguard, unsuccessfully 
proposing an additional POW candidate. As a corollary, it can be inferred 
that for Danish and most other delegates the ambit of the GCIV was not 
regarded as extensive enough to encompass homeland battlefield 
unprivileged belligerents. 
 
Nevertheless, a closer inspection of the draft records of the Diplomatic 
Conference reveals that the idea of the GCIV as the ‘gap-filler’ was 
supported by two most influential delegations:  the USSR and the US. On 
one hand, the records of both Committees II and III amply show the USSR’s 
consistent and express endorsement. 217  On the other hand, the US 
 
215  See Art. 50(1) of the 1977 Geneva Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts. 
Compare Part IV, Art. 2 of the 1934 First Draft Convention adopted in Monaco (Sanitary 
Cities and Localities). 
216  By 24 votes to 15, with 5 abstentions. Final Record, vol. II-B, at 270, 13th Plenary 
Meeting, 26 Jul. 1949 (with the phrase ‘military tribunals’ changed to the wording 
‘competent tribunals’). The entire text of Art. 4 was approved by 32 votes to nil, with 10 
abstentions:  id., at 272. 
217  For Committee II, see, e.g., id., at 271 13th Plenary Meeting, 26 Jul. 1949, (emphasis 
added) (Mr. Morosov, USSR). 
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admonition that the GCIV should fill the lacunae of the personal categories 
of the GCIII seemed more spasmodic than firmly convinced. Their thinking 
can be inferred from the US proposal in relation to the first sub-paragraph of 
Article 3(2) of the Stockholm POW Draft (Article 4B(1) GCIII). This sub-
paragraph, as seen above, secured the POW rights for the ex-members of 
regular armed forces of the occupied state. At Special Committee of 
Committee II, the US proposed this first sub-paragraph to be expunged on 
the ground that such persons ‘ought to be covered by the Civilians 
Conventions [sic], and not by the Prisoners of War Convention’. 218  One 
author concludes that the US must have excluded ‘battlefield unprivileged 
belligerents’ from the parameters of the GCIV. In his reasoning, to eschew 
the duplication, the US delegation would have proposed the elimination also 
of the third paragraph of Article 3 of the Stockholm POW Draft, had they 
believed that all types of unprivileged belligerents were already covered by 
the GCIV.219  Yet, as a matter of fact, another US delegate in the same 
meeting did make a proposal to that effect.220 Accordingly, after such closer 
scrutiny, the hypothesis that the US delegates treated the GCIV as the safety-




The draft provisions of the Geneva Conventions have undergone several 
phases of metamorphoses and reconstitutions. It has turned out that 
Committee II’s lengthy debates on the Stockholm POW Draft (especially, on 
the wretched third paragraph of Article 3) at the 1949 Diplomatic 
Conference supply more fertile ground than the travaux of the GCIV for 
exploring drafters’ underlying thought on unprivileged belligerents (or the 
civilians overall) trapped in their homeland combat zones. The preceding 
analyses suggest that most delegates grasped the ‘minimum protection 
clause’ contained in that paragraph as the sole gap-filler for the persons that 
would fall outside the bounds of the GCIII. In the light of the polemics over 
whether or not to eliminate that clause, it can be assumed that most 
negotiators were then convinced of (or resigned to) the idea that the 
protective scheme of the GCIV (or its Part III) was not so comprehensive as 
some hoped it to be. Indeed, the inference drawn from the draft records 
corroborates the hypothesis that the majority of the negotiators of the 
 
218  Final Record, vol. II-A, at 431, Special Committee of Committee II, 7th meeting, 19 May 
1949 (General Parker, US). See also the statement of General Dillon, US. Id. 
219  Callen, supra note 1, at 1057-58. 
220  Final Record, vol. II-A, at 431, Special Committee of Committee II, 7th meeting, 19 May 
1949 (General Parker, US). 
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Geneva Conventions set the parameters of Part III of the GCIV confined to 
the protected persons held in occupied territory or in enemy territory.221  
 
Nevertheless, such outcomes borne out by historical interpretation are no 
obstacle to the present-day interpreters’ almost instinctive impulse to venture 
a teleological interpretation that can promote more expansive scope of 
guarantees of the GCIV. At least with respect to Section I of Part III, Pictet’s 
Commentary to the GCIV (1958), with remarkable acuity only nine years 
after the Geneva Diplomatic Conference, felt able to reconceive most of the 
provisions in that section (Articles 27 and 31-34 GCIV) as expressive of 




221  Needless to say, the material scope of their protections of the GCIV could be curbed by 
the derogation clause under Art. 5 of the GCIV. 
222  Pictet’s Commentary to the GCIV at 200-201 (regarding Art. 27 as ‘the basis on which 
the entire provisions of the GCIV is built), and 228 and 231 (considering Arts. 33 and 34 
of the GCIV to recognise the rights of ‘absolute’ nature, and the scope of application of 
those provisions as wide as that envisaged by Art. 4 of the GCIV).  
